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For many years the federal judiciary has treated forum non conveniens
as a housekeeping rule for the federal court system.' If indeed this is correct,
the federal house is in need of a serious spring cleaning. Circuit splits
abound, 2 the standards used and the evidence required for forum non
conveniens dismissals vary widely among the district courts, and reverse
forum shopping through removal and transfer is commonplace.4 The
problem, however, goes beyond a little clutter. Closer inspection reveals that
the very foundation upon which the doctrine rests is unstable. Though built
upon the inherent authority of Article III, federal forum non conveniens lies
in the area over which Congress may exercise plenary power. Time has
changed the congressional landscape: the base upon which the forum non
conveniens dismissal structure rests has eroded away, leaving the federal
courts in congressionally occupied territory without constitutional support.
In 1947, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilber? claimed that the courts had inherent
power under Article III to dismiss properly filed actions if necessary to
protect defendants and courts from abusive tactics by plaintiffs." In Gulf Oil
both personal jurisdiction and venue were undoubtedly proper in the
district where the plaintiff filed the diversity action. And while admonishing
courts that a "plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed, " 8 Gulf
Oil asserted for the judiciary the inherent authority to "decline jurisdiction
in exceptional circumstances"-instances in which plaintiffs "seek not
simply justice but perhaps justice blended with some harassment."'0 Gulf Oil
set forth a laundry list of private and public interest factors to be considered

1. As Justice Scalia explained in American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443 (1994),
.venue . . . is a matter of judicial housekeeping." Id. at 457. "[T]he doctrine of forum non
conveniens is nothing more or less than a supervening venue provision, permitting displacement
of the ordinary rules of venue when, in light of certain conditions, the trial court thinks that
jurisdiction ought to be declined." Id. at 453. For a provocative look at the use by the courts of
the term "housekeeping," see generally Judith Resnick, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of
Work in Federal Trial Courts, 24 GA. L. REV. 909 (1990).
2. See infra notes 66-78 and accompanying text. See generally Martin Davies, Time to Change
the FederalForum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 TUL. L. REv. 309 (2002) (discussing differences in

forum non conveniens approaches across the federal courts).
3. See Davies, supra note 2, at 318, 351-53; infra note 74 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665, 670 (5th Cir. 2003);
Gschwind v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 161 F.3d 602, 604 (10th Cir. 1998); Dominguez-Cota v. Cooper
Tire & Rubber Co., 284 F. Supp. 2d 444, 446-47 (N.D. Miss. 2003), vacated, 396 F.3d 650 (5th
Cir. 2005).
5. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 501, 504-09.
Id. at 504.
Id. at 508.
Id. at 504.
GulfOil, 330 U.S. at 507.
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in the "rare12 case " " and left such decisions to the "sound discretion" of the
trial court.

In dissent, Justice Black objected strenuously that the Supreme Court
had no power to decline congressionally conferred jurisdiction in a case at
common law.13 As if viewing the twenty-first century through a crystal ball, he
predicted:
The Court's new rule will thus clutter the very threshold of the
federal courts with a preliminary trial of fact concerning the
relative convenience of forums. .

.

. The broad and indefinite

discretion left to federal courts to decide the question of
convenience from the welter of factors which are relevant to such a
judgment, will inevitably produce a complex of close and
indistinguishable decisions from which accurate prediction
of the
14
proper forum will become difficult, if not impossible.
In closing, Justice Black wrote: "[w]hether the doctrine of forum
non
15
conveniens is good or bad, I should wait for Congress to adopt it."
Only months after the Gulf Oil decision, Congress responded to the
forum non conveniens dilemma by authorizing inter-district transfers under
28 U.S.C. § 1404.16 Section 1404 puts to rest the domestic forum non
conveniens problem raised in Gulf Oil. The federal forum non conveniens
doctrine now comes into play only in transnational cases where the
alternative forum is foreign. 7 The 1981 decision in Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno,i1 therefore, was of particular importance. By a four-to-three vote, the
Piper Court distinguished between the deference due to a domestic
plaintiff's choice of forum and that required when the plaintiff is foreign. 9
According to' Piper, a foreign plaintiff's choice of forum "deserves less

11. Id. at 509; see also infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
12. Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 511.
13. Id. at 512-13 (Black,J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 516 (Black,J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 517 (Black,J., dissenting).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000). The statute provides: "[f]or the convenience of parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought." Id. As Professor Allan Stein explains,
Congress was actually in the process of debating the transfer legislation when the Court handed
down the Gulf Oil decision. Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of CourtAccess Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 781, 805-07 (1985). "[T]he proposed provision was cited as
support for the court of appeals' assertion in [ Gulf Oil] that the remedy for inconvenient venue
should be legislation rather than judicial adoption of forum non conveniens." Id. at 807 n.105
(citation omitted).
17. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 n.2 (1994) (explaining that, as a result
of § 1404, "the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens has continuing application only in cases
where the alternative forum is abroad").
18. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
19. Id. at 256.
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,,20

deference., justice Marshall explained: "[w]hen the home forum has been
chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient. When
the
2
plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption is much less reasonable. 1
The post-Piper forum non conveniens regime has received scant praise
in the academic literature. 2 As currently styled, the doctrine rewards forum
shopping, specifically reverse forum shopping by defendants. 23 The antics of
the Brown & Yellow Taxicab Company of Erie fame 24 are positively
amateurish when compared to the sophisticated forum non conveniens
practice of American corporate defendants in transnational disputes.
Moreover, forum non conveniens dismissal standards have become steadily
less predictable over the years. Uncertainty breeds litigation. Since Piper,
courts and litigants have jumped on the forum non conveniens bandwagon.
Although the Ninth Circuit recently admonished lower courts that "less
deference is not the same thing as no deference, ,,25 it is not at all clear what
the forum non conveniens standard is. What is clear is that virtually no case
involving a transnational event is immune from a forum non conveniens

20. Id.
21.
Id. at 255-56.
22. The literature is replete with criticism of the doctrine. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 2, at
311-12 (urging a complete overhaul of doctrine); David W. Robertson, The Federal Doctrine of
Forum Non Conveniens: "An Object Lesson in UncontrolledDiscretion,"29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 353, 353-65
(1994) (deploring excesses of forum non conveniens); Stein, supra note 16, at 785 (stating that
forum non conveniens cases form a "crazy quilt" of inconsistent decisions); Margaret G. Stewart,
Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in Search of a Role, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1268 (1986) ("[Piper]
seems wrongly decided."); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, The Irony of Instrumentalism: Using Dworkin's
Principle-Rule Distinctionto Reconceptualize Metaphorically a Substance-ProcedureDissonanceExemplified
by Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals in InternationalProduct Injury Cases, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 425, 434
(2004) (arguing that the Piper Court has created a "stark analytic dissonance"); Megan Waples,
Note, The Adequate Alternative Forum Analysis in Forum Non Conveniens: A Casefor Reform, 36 CONN.
L. REV. 1475, 1476 (2004) (finding that an unexplainable gap has developed in forum non
conveniens as a result of Piper and Gilbert). But see generally Douglas W. Dunham & Eric F.
Gladbach, Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign Plaintiffs in the 1990s, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 665
(1999) (defending the doctrine); Russell J. Weintraub, InternationalLitigation and Forum Non
Conveniens, 29 TEX. INT'L LJ. 321, 332-38 (1994) (same).
23. The term "reverse forum shopping" is used in this Article to refer to defense forum
shopping both through motions to dismiss for forum non conveniens in state or federal court
and through efforts to remove from state to federal court to obtain a more favorable forum non
conveniens environment.
24. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73 (1938) (citing Black & White Taxicab &
Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928)). The "Taxicab
case" was made notorious by Justice Brandeis who used it in Erie to illustrate the outrageous
forum shopping engendered by the Swift v. Tyson regime. Id. at 73-74. In a nutshell, the facts
were as follows: knowing that an exclusive contract with the railroad would be unenforceable
under Kentucky law, the Brown & Yellow Taxicab Company, which operated exclusively in
Bowling Green, Kentucky, reincorporated under the laws of Tennessee and executed its
contract with the railroad in Tennessee. Id. It then sued in federal court in Kentucky to enforce
the contract and won because the federal court applied the federal general common law
instead state law. Id.
25. Ravelo Monegro v. Rosa, 211 F.3d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 2000).
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battle. In the decade following Gulf Oil, the federal courts delivered
approximately twenty-nine forum non conveniens
opinions;26 almost twice
27
alone.
2003
in
that many decisions were reported
The contours of the "inherent power" upon which the forum non
conveniens dismissal authority is premised are similarly murky.2 For
centuries, the judiciary has spoken of an "inherent power" that emanates
from Article III. 29 The Court has relied on this implied authority in a variety
of situations to sanction misbehavior in and out of the courtroom, 30 to

manage litigation and control dockets, 1 and to supervise federal criminal
litigation. 32

26. "Approximately" is used in recognition of the fact that Westlaw may not have picked
up all the forum non conveniens decisions during this period and that some such decisions may
not have been reported at all. The number was obtained by performing a Westlaw Key search
for forum non conveniens restricted to federal cases between January 1, 1948 and January 1,
1958. The exact search used was: (170BK45 106K28 401K52) & DA(AFT 01/01/1948) &
DA(BEF 01/01/1958).
27. A search between January 1, 2003, and January 1, 2004, using a Westlaw Key search
revealed fifty-three cases during that period involving forum non conveniens in the federal
courts. The exact search used was: (170BK45 106K28 401K52) & DA(AFT 01/01/2003) &
DA(BEF 01/01/2004).

28. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural
Constitution,86 IOWA L. REv. 735, 741 (2001) (criticizing the Court's "indiscriminate application
of the label 'inherent powers' to a grab bag of judicial functions and its failure to explain their
amenability to political control").
29. For example, the Supreme Court has stated:
That the power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts, has been many
times decided and may be regarded as settled law. It is essential to the
administration of justice. The courts of the United States, when called into
existence and vested with jurisdiction over any subject, at once become possessed
of the power.
Michaelson v. United States ex rel Chi., St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. Co., 266 U.S. 42, 6566 (1924); see also Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920) ("Courts have (at least in the
absence of legislation to the contrary) inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate
instruments required for the performance of their duties."); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 1, 15 (1825) ("Every court has, like every other public political body, the power
necessary and proper to provide for the orderly conduct of its business."); United States v.
Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) ("Certain implied powers must necessarily result to
our courts ofjustice from the nature of their institution.").
30. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 42-55 (1991) (upholding the trial
court's inherent power to sanction); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-67
(1980) (recognizing the judiciary's independent sanctioning authority); see also Pushaw, supra
note 28, at 764-79.
31.
See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706-07 (1997) (discussing the broad inherent
power of district courts to stay proceedings); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31
(1962) (upholding use of inherent power to dismiss for failure to prosecute in spite of language
in Rule 41); see also Pushaw, supra note 28, at 760-64.
32. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-47 (1943) (creating the exclusionary
rule); see also Pushaw, supra note 28, at 779-82.
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Although there exists a core judicial (or adjudicatory33 ) power immune
from congressional regulation, the Court has long acknowledged that much
of its inherent authority is subject to partial or complete legislative control.34
Forum non conveniens resides near the outer edge of the inherent power,
within the territory over which Congress retains plenary authority. The
problem lies in determining when Congress has regulated this outermost
province with sufficient conviction to preclude judicial occupation. Congress
may change course, revise statutes, or reserve greater authority to itself in
the area; or the inherent power doctrine itself may develop in a manner
inconsistent with congressional regulatory goals. A judicial inherent power
innovation, though constitutional at inception, may find itself in a
constitutional no-man's land with the passage of time.
In the forum non conveniens context, the inherent power landscape
has undergone a transformation since Gulf Oil and Piper. Revisions of the
general
venue statutes now explicitly provide for the routine transnational36
35
case, myriad federal enactments seek to regulate extraterritorial conduct,3
and the Court and Congress have come to different understandings of their
respective spheres under the Rules Enabling and Rules of Decision Acts. 7
Federal forum non conveniens jurisprudence forms a "crazy quilt"3 8 of

arbitrary and inconsistent decisions. And the exponential growth of the
global economy has altered irrevocably the very nature of litigation in the
United States courts. 39
This Article takes the position that the Court must abandon the forum
non conveniens doctrine as an unconstitutional usurpation of congressional
power. Supreme Court precedents stress that the inherent authority should
be used only in cases of strict necessity and under strict control. 40 When

33. SeeJames S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "SomeEffectual Power": The Quantity and Quality
of DecisionmakingRequired of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 759 (1998). Liebman and
Ryan contend that the adjudicatory power has five essential qualities: "An Article III court must
decide (1) the whole federal question (2) independently and (3) finally, based on (4) the
whole supreme law, and (5) impose a remedy that, in the process of binding the parties to the
court's judgment, effectuates supreme law and neutralizes contrary law." Id. at 696.
34. See infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 144-149 and accompanying text.
36. See infra note 128.
37. See discussion infra Part III.C.
38. Stein, supra note 16, at 785.
39. See GARY B. BORN WITH DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 1 (2d ed. 1992) (explaining that increased
globalization has translated into increased litigation in U.S. courts); Daniel J. Dorward,
Comment, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine and the Judicial Protection of Multinational
Corporationsfrom Forum Shopping Plaintiffs, 19 U. PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 141, 142 (1998) (discussing
the large increase of foreign disputes in American courts).
40. See Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823-24, 829 (1996) ("A court's inherent
power is limited by the necessity giving rise to its exercise."); Young v. United States ex rel.
Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 801 (1987) (courts should exercise their "inherent power of self-
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Congress has provided venue and jurisdiction, or more particularly the rules
of decision in a case, necessity, in all but the most unusual situation, is
difficult to infer. In terms of control, the arbitrary nature of the current
approach smacks of lawlessness. And like its cousin, the general common law
of Swift v. Tyson, 41 "[e]xperience in applying the doctrine ... ha[s] revealed
its defects, political and social; and the benefits expected to flow from the
rule [have] not accrue[d]." 42 A "housekeeping rule" that generates litigation
and widespread forum shopping deserves no such designation. The time has
come to put the federal house in order.
Part I of this Article discusses the development of the forum non
conveniens doctrine in the Supreme Court and the prevailing
pandemonium in the lower federal courts. Part II explores the limits of the
federal judiciary's inherent power. This section argues that the Supreme
Court's approach, which assumes that Congress legislates against a backdrop
of inherent power lawmaking, has no place in the outer reaches of the
inherent authority where the forum non conveniens doctrine lies. As the
judiciary moves toward the periphery of its inherent power, the Court,
rather than Congress, should shoulder the burden of insuring that inherent
power innovation conflicts neither directly nor indirectly with congressional
policy goals. Part III exposes the friction-producing aspects of the forum
non conveniens regime by examining the conflicts between the prevailing
doctrine and each of the following: the federal venue and transfer scheme,
jurisdiction to prescribe theory, the Rules Enabling Act, and the Rules of
Decision Act. Part IV concludes that the Court's forum non conveniens
regime encroaches directly upon congressional territory and is therefore
unconstitutional.
I.

FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

Decided in 1947, Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert 3 continues to provide the basic
framework for forum non conveniens dismissals in the federal courts. The
Gulf Oil formula has two parts: a district court must first determine that an
alternative forum is available 44 and then must evaluate the relevant private
and public interests at stake. 45 The now-familiar list of private interest factors
protection only as a last resort"); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) ("The
inherent powers of federal courts are those which 'are necessary to the exercise of all others.'"
(quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812))).
41.
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (holding that federal courts may fashion general federal

common law for diversity actions).
42. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938).
43. 330 U.S. 501 (1947). Gulf Oilinvolved a tort action brought in the Southern District of
New York by a Virginia resident for damages to his Virginia warehouse. Id. at 502-03.

44. Id. at 506-07 ("In all cases in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes into
play, it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable to process; the
doctrine furnishes criteria for choice between them.").
45. Id.
at508.
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includes "access to sources of proof," "availability of compulsory process for
attendance of the unwilling," the "cost of obtaining attendance of . . .
witnesses," the possibility of viewing any premises (if appropriate to the
action), the enforceability of the judgment, the "relative advantages and
obstacles to a fair trial," and a catch-all category encompassing "all other
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive.
Factors relevant to the public interest focus on docket
congestion, the burden ofjury service in a community having "no relation to
the litigation," the "local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home," and, in diversity cases, the interest in having the trial in the forum
whose law will apply to the controversy.4 7
Emphasizing that "unless the balance is strongly in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed,"48 Gulf
Oil restricted forum non conveniens dismissals to unusual situations-those
"rare cases" tinged with a little "harassment." 49 The post-Gulf Oil experience
suggests that the lower federal courts took this admonition to heart, issuing
approximately 122 forum non conveniens decisions during the entire period
between 1947 and 1981.50
But in 1981, Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno 1 changed the face of forum non
conveniens practice. In Piper, the Court granted certiorari to consider
whether forum non conveniens dismissals were prohibited when the law in
the alternative forum was less favorable to the plaintiff.52 All seven of the

participating Justices answered in the negative. The opinion, however,
continued. Writing for a majority of only four, 53 Justice Marshall undertook

a detailed examination of the district court's dismissal criteria. It is here that
Marshall reached the critical conclusion that "a foreign plaintiffs choice [of
54
forum]

deserves less deference" than that of an American

plaintiff.

According to the majority opinion: "When the home forum has been
46.

Id.

47.

Id. at 508-09.

48. GulfOil, 330 U.S. at 508.
49. Id. at 507.
50. This number is an estimate. Some forum non conveniens decisions may not have been
reported; the Westlaw Key search or even Westlaw itself could have missed some of the cases.
The number was obtained by performing a Westlaw Key search for "forum non conveniens"
between 1948 and 1981. The exact search used was: (170BK45 106K28 401K52) & DA(AFT
01/01/1948) & DA(BEF 01/01/1981). The same search, restricted to cases between December
8, 1981 (when Piper was decided), and January 1, 2005, found 603 cases-almost five times the

number of cases in half the time.
51.
52.

454 U.S. 235 (1981).
Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 149 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 450 U.S. 909

(1981).
53. Joining Justice Marshall in the majority were Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Rehnquist and Blackmun. Piper,454 U.S. at 237. Justices Powell and O'Connor took no part in
the decision of the case. Id.
54. Id. at 256.
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chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient. When the
55
plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption is much less reasonable.
Justices White, Stevens, and Brennan dissented from Part III (the
portion of the opinion embracing a lesser presumption). Justice White
complained in a one-sentence opinion that he "would not proceed to deal
with the issues addressed in Part III. "56 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice
Brennan, echoed Justice White's complaint, but noted in the next
paragraph that he would "simply remand the case to the Court of Appeals
for further consideration of the question whether the District Court
correctly decided that Pennsylvania was not a convenient forum in which to
litigate a claim against a Pennsylvania company that a plane was defectively
57
designed and manufactured in Pennsylvania."
Since Piper, the Supreme Court has remained silent regarding the
contours and content of the federal forum non conveniens doctrine. The
1994 American Dredging Co. v. Mille s decision did nothing to illuminate the
proper standards to be used, declaring only that federal forum non
conveniens was not preemptive on the States in general maritime cases. 59
But in reaching this conclusion, Justice Scalia had the following to say:
[T] o tell the truth, forum non conveniens cannot really be relied upon
in making decisions about secondary conduct-in deciding, for
example, where to sue or where one is subject to being sued. The
discretionary nature of the doctrine, combined with the
multifariousness of the factors relevant to its application . . .make
uniformity and predictability of outcome almost impossible ....
We have emphasized that "[e]ach case turns on its facts" and have
repeatedly rejected the use of per se rules in applying the doctrine.
In such a regime, one can rarely count on the fact that jurisdiction
will be declined. 60

55. Id. at 255-56. While Piper reconfigured the purpose of forum non conveniens
dismissals, it did not change a single word in the Gulf Oil factor list. Nor did it purport to revise
the burden on the defendant or the frequency with which cases should be dismissed on forum
non conveniens grounds. A "grave inconvenience" burden and a "lesser presumption" for
foreign plaintiffs are difficult to harmonize, and lower court opinions applying the post-Piper
regime have been predictably problematic.
56. Id. at 261 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. Id. at 262 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
58. 510 U.S. 443 (1994).
59. Id. at 456-57. The issue of the case was whether refusal to permit a forum non
conveniens dismissal in state court in an action brought pursuant to general maritime law
would alter substantive maritime law. Id. at 447. The Supreme Court concluded that forum non
conveniens is neither a characteristic feature of federal maritime law nor is it necessary to
maintain the proper harmony of maritime law, and it held that states may apply their own
forum non conveniens rules in the maritime context. Id.
60.

Id. at 455 (citations omitted) (quoting Piper, 454 U.S. at 249).
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With little guidance and an abuse of discretion standard for appellate
review, 6] the lower federal courts have done exactly what one would
expect-they have run amuck. Justice Scalia's description of the "truth" in
American Dredging2 nicely illustrates this point. The only flaw in his analysis
stems from his use of rose-colored glasses. Forum non conveniens cases in
the federal courts have startlingly similar factual circumstances; the results
differ not because "'[e]ach case turns on its facts," '64 but because federal
65
judges are applying different standards in our "unified federal system."
A recent article by Martin Davies paints a disturbing picture of the
federal regime. 66 Circuit splits exist on a wide array of petty, yet dispositive,
forum non conveniens issues. Consider, for example, that when assessing
the "enforceability of judgment," some courts consider whether the United
States judgment is enforceable abroad, 67 while others consider whether a
judgment acquired in the alternative jurisdiction would be enforceable in
the United States.68 In some circuits, "it is unnecessary to consider the public
interest factors at all if the private interest factors indicate that the case
should be dismissed, " 69 while others appear to give equal weight to each
category.70 The meaning of Gu/f Oils "burden on local juries" factor varies

61.
See Piper,454 U.S. at 257 ("The forum non conveniens determination is committed to the
sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of
discretion ....").

62. Am. Dredging,510 U.S. at 455.
63. In 1985, Professor Stein convincingly illustrated this point through an analysis of air
crash cases. The only difference of note in these actions seemed to be the courts in which the
cases were filed. See Stein, supra note 16, at 833-37; see also Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274
F.3d 65, 70-72 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (reversing forum non conveniens dismissal of a case
involving an elevator accident in Colombia); Iragorri v. Int'l Elevator, Inc., 203 F.3d 8, 10-11
(1st Cir. 2000) (upholding forum non conveniens dismissal of a case involving same Colombian
accident); Morales v. Ford Motor Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 672, 673-74 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (dismissing
a case involving a Ford Explorer rollover in Venezuela on forum non conveniens grounds); In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1128-29 (S.D. Ind.
2002) (declining to dismiss numerous actions involving Ford Explorer rollovers in Venezuela
on forum non conveniens grounds).
64. Am. Dredging, 510 U.S. at 455 (quoting Piper,454 U.S. at 249).
65. Piper,454 U.S. at 254 (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 613 (1964)).
66. See generally Davies, supranote 2.
67. Id. at 348-49 & n.185 (citing Gonzalez v. Naviera Neptuno, A.A., 832 F.2d 876, 879
(5th Cir. 1987) (discussing the "difficulty of enforcing a U.S. judgment in Peru")); accord
Scottish Air Int'l, Inc. v. British Caledonian Group, PLC, 81 F.3d 1224, 1233 (2d Cir. 1996)
(considering enforcing United States judgment in Great Britain); Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Linter
Group, Ltd., 994 F.2d 996, 1001 (2d Cir. 1993) (considering enforcement of United States
judgment in Australia).
68. See Davies, supra note 2, at 349 n.187 (citing Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 981
F.2d 824, 836 (5th Cir. 1993) (involving a German judgment in the United States)).
69. Id. at 352 & nn.201-05 (discussing this approach in the Fifth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits).
70. Id. at 352-53 & nn.206-14 (explaining that the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits ascribe to this position).
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across the federal system: "[s]ome courts simply look to see whether there is
any substantial connection between the controversy and the forum: if there
is . .. [the] forum is regarded as appropriate, no matter what the
connection with other possible forums"; 7 1 "[o]thers engage in a kind of
interest analysis, comparing the interest [of] the U.S. forum" with that of the
foreign forum.72 And when considering the relevance of docket congestion,
the circuits are split over whether the analysis should be comparative as it is
in § 1404 cases, or whether the absolute congestion of a court's docket is
sufficient. 73 Lastly, even after a district court concludes that dismissal is
proper, some disagreement exists-the Fifth Circuit, standing alone, treats
the failure to provide
a return jurisdiction clause in the order to dismiss as
74
reversible error.
In addition to these seemingly minor discrepancies, fundamental
disagreements about forum non conveniens infect the courts of appeals.
The presumption afforded to a foreign plaintiff's choice of forum varies by
circuit. v5 The standards by which the courts assess the availability of an
alternative forum in a foreign state are inconsistent.76 The significance of the

71.
Id. at 361 & n.246 (citing cases); accord Helmer v. Doletskaya, 393 F.3d 201, 203 (D.C.
Cir. 2004); Zinsler v. Marriot Corp., 605 F. Supp. 1499, 1502-04 (D. Md. 1985).
72. Davies, supra note 2, at 361 & n.247 (citing cases); accord SME Racks, Inc. v. Sistemas
Mecanicos Para Electronica, S.A., 382 F.3d 1097, 1101-05 (11th Cir. 2004); DiRienzo v. Phillips
Serv. Corp., 294 F.3d 21, 28 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[The United States had] interest in having United
States courts enforce United States securities laws.").
73. Davies, supranote 2, at 363-64 & nn.257-62 (citing cases). Compare Gschwind v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 161 F.3d 602, 609 (10th Cir. 1998) (considering the court's own congestion as a
dispositive factor), with Lony v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 935 F.2d 604, 613 (3d Cir.
1991) (comparing the court's own backlogged docket to that of Germany), and Gates Learjet
Corp. v.Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1337 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The real issue is not whether a dismissal
will reduce a court's congestion but whether a trial may be speedier in another court because of
its less crowded docket.").
74. Davies, supra note 2, at 318 (citing Robinson v. TCI/US W. Cable Commc'n, Inc., 117
F.3d 900, 907 (5th Cir. 1997)).
75. Compare Monegro v. Rosa, 211 F.3d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring a defendant to
make a "'clear showing of facts which ... establish such oppression and vexation of [defendant]
as to be out of proportion to plaintiffs convenience, which may be shown to be slight or
nonexistent'" (quoting Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1983))), with
Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (embracing a
sliding scale of presumptions dependent upon the plaintiffs motives for choosing the U.S.
forum).
76. According to Piper, in order to fail the adequacy test, "the remedy provided by the
alternative forum [must be] so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all."
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981). Application of the "no remedy at all"
standard has proven problematic for the federal courts of appeals in cases where the foreign
forum recognizes the cause of action but significant delay characterizes that country's legal
system. Compare Bhanagar v. Surrendra Overseas, Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1227 (3d Cir. 1995)
(noting that "delays of a few years [are] of no legal significance in the forum non conveniens
calculus," while delays of "up to a quarter of a century" make forum non conveniens dismissal
"inappropriate"), with Leon v. Millon Air, Inc., 251 F.3d 1305, 1311-12 (lth Cir. 2001)
(treating delay as irrelevant to the alternative forum determination, considering it as part of the
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choice of law finding runs the gamut from the Tenth Circuit, which exempts
all domestic claims from forum non conveniens dismissal, to the Second
Circuit, which exempts none." And the application of treaty provisions is
unpredictable. 8
Forum non conveniens is a doctrine in crisis. The academic literature
contains extensive debate regarding the federal approach. Commentators
79
have both praised and condemned the extent of the courts' discretion,
argued that the doctrine is obsolete,8 ° and offered an array of suggestions to
improve the situation."' Professor Allan Stein scrutinized the federal forum
non conveniens regime through the lens of federalism and concluded that
aspects of the current approach are incompatible with the Rules of Decision
Act."' In another excellent Article, Professor Stein suggested that forum non
conveniens duplicates many of the values found in personal and subject
matter jurisdiction rules. And building on this analysis, Professor Margaret
Stewart questioned the necessity of the doctrine in light of conflict of laws

ultimate convenience analysis instead), Borja v. Dole Food Co., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23234, at
*15-16 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2002) (same), and In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods.
Liab. Litig., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1153 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (same).
77. See generally Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman & Keith A. Rowley, Forum Non Conveniens in
Federal Statutory Cases, 49 EMORY L.J. 1137 (2000). Since Congress may "preempt judicial
discretion to decline jurisdiction," id. at 1139, the lower federal courts have examined "special"
venue statutes for evidence that Congress wished to immunize particular federal claims from
forum non conveniens scrutiny. Id. at 1138-39. In the First and Second Circuits, any federal
statutory action may now be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. Id. at 1139 & n.12
(citing cases). The Fifth Circuit takes a similar position, but exempts federal antitrust cases. Id.
at 1177-79 & nn.270, 283 (citing Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 890 (5th Cir.
1982); Tivoli Realty, Inc. v. Interstate Circuit, Inc., 167 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1948)). The Ninth
and Eleventh Circuits embrace a "modified approach": if the choice of law analysis finds that
the Antitrust Acts or the Jones Act applies, then a forum non conveniens dismissal is precluded.
Id. at 1181-82. If, however, the action is one based on RICO, the Securities Acts, the Lanham
Act, or the Copyright statutes, the normal "rules" of forum non conveniens apply, and forum
non conveniens may be sought. Id. at 1181-84 & nn.305-07. And the Tenth Circuit dispenses
with the Gulf Oil balancing test entirely if domestic law, either federal or state, is found to
govern the dispute. See Needham v. Phillips Petroleum Co. of Nor., 719 F.2d 1481, 1483 (10th
Cir. 1983) (finding that where domestic law applies or where a foreign forum is inadequate,
forum non conveniens is inapplicable).
78. Compare Trivelloni-Lorenzi v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. (In re Air Crash Disaster),
821 F.2d 1147, 1160-62 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (holding that the Warsaw Convention venue
provisions do not prohibit dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds), vacated on other
grounds, 490 U.S. 1032 (1989), with Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc., 305 F.3d 989, 1004 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that the Warsaw Convention preempts use of forum non conveniens).
79. Compare Weintraub, supra note 22, at 332-38 (praising the forum non conveniens
regime), with Robertson, supranote 22, at 378-80 (arguing against uncontrolled discretion).
80. Davies, supranote 2, at 311-16, 383-86.
81. E.g., id. at 383-86 (offering a plethora of possible remedies for an improved forum
non conveniens analysis); Hoffman & Rowley, supra note 77, at 1208-09 (suggesting a central
role for interest analysis).
82. Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 YALE L.J. 1935, 2006 (1991).
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and jurisdiction to prescribe theories. "' But the scholarly commentary has
paid little attention to the question of power-specifically, the Court's power
to create such a dismissal structure. 4 A close analysis of the federal forum
non conveniens framework vis-A-vis congressional power suggests that the
Court is guilty of overreaching. In the sections that follow, this Article argues
that the federal forum non conveniens doctrine is unconstitutional,
occupying territory reserved by the Constitution to Congress.
II. THE UNCERTAIN BOUNDARIES OF THE SUPREME COURT'S INHERENT POWER
Although Article III is specific regarding the identity of the institutions
that may exercise the 'Judicial Power" and enumerates the "cases" and
"controversies" to which that power may extend, it provides no hint as to
how the judiciary should go about exercising its authority on a day-to-day
basis. 85 The Framers understood courts as having the implied power to
handle the business of adjudicating cases."6 And the Supreme Court referred
to its inherent powers early on, defining them as those that "cannot be
dispensed with.., because they are necessary to the exercise of all others." 87
The judiciary has tapped its inherent authority, for example, to supervise the
criminal justice system,8 8 impose an array of sanctions,89 control dockets and
manage litigation, 90 and even create the general federal common law. 9'
83. See generally Stewart, supra note 22.
84. In his exhaustive historical and structural analysis of the Supreme Court's inherent
power, Professor Pushaw considered the legitimacy of the forum non conveniens doctrine
among many other inherent power innovations and concluded that it was unconstitutional. See
Pushaw, supra note 28, at 743, 855-56.
85. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 16 (photo. reprint 1963)
(1914) (noting that regarding "what [the judicial] power is, what are its intrinsic nature and
scope, [the Constitution] says not a word").
86. See Pushaw, supranote 28, at 799.
87. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
88. See, e.g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-47 (1943) (creating an
exclusionary rule).
89. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-67 (1980) (allowing a lower
court to bar production of certain evidence at trial, strike claims, and impose costs as
sanctions).
90. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706-07 (1997) ("The District Court has broad
discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket."); Link v.
Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962) (finding inherent power to dismiss for failure to
prosecute); Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207 (1958) (finding that the Supreme Court is granted authority under
the Rules and its own inherent power to ensure that its orders are followed). Although a
"plethora of procedural rules expressly grant federal judges broad discretion to direct civil
litigation," Professor Pushaw notes that "judges have asserted even more inherent managerial
power than these rules confer." Pushaw, supra note 28, at 763. ProfessorJudith Resnick has also
expressed concerns about district court judges' use of the inherent power while managing
litigation. SeeJudith Resnick, ManagerialJudges,96 HARv. L. REV. 374, 398-99 (1982).
91. In Swift v. Tyson, Justice Story found implicit in the grant of diversity jurisdiction the
authority to create the general federal common law for diversity cases in federal court. For a
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The Court has often cautioned that "the extent of these [inherent]
powers must be delimited with care, for there is a danger of overreaching
when one branch of the Government, without benefit of cooperation or
92
correction from the others, undertakes to define its own authority."
Consistent with this admonition, the Court has announced certain
delimiting principles suggesting that the inherent power extends only to
those instances "necessary to permit the courts to function. "93 But like many
an inherent power innovation, forum non conveniens is difficult to
reconcile with the Court's delimiting principles. Few modern forum non
conveniens dismissals are necessary for the courts to function. And the
arbitrary, almost lawless, state of the federal regime does not suggest that the
Court has exercised sufficient control to avoid judicial overreaching.
Defining the limits of the inherent power is made all the more difficult
by the fact that the strength of the Court's authority seems to depend upon
the activity it seeks to regulate. There exists a core power, which Professor
Robert Pushaw calls the "pure judicial power," encompassing the
constitutional duty to adjudicate independently cases and controversies.9 5 As
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,Inc. demonstrates, congressional interference in this
sphere constitutes a separation of powers violation. 96

modern interpretation of the Swift Court's reasoning, see Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie
and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. REv. 673, 682-83 (1998), which states that "soon
after Swift and throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Supreme Court
and commentators justified the Swift regime primarily on constitutional grounds. They
consistently argued that Article III's purpose to provide a neutral forum protecting
nonresidents from discrimination justified Swift and its progeny."
92. Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996) (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v.
Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980)); accord Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 764 ("Because inherent
powers are shielded from direct democratic controls, they must be exercised with restraint and
discretion.").
93. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 819-20 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment); see also Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 764 ("The inherent powers of
federal courts are those which 'are necessary to the exercise of all others.'" (quoting United
States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812))); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
204, 226-27 (1821) (discussing courts' inherent powers).
94. See Pushaw, supra note 28, at 855-56. As a general matter, the notion of a limited
inherent power does not seem to have caught on. A Westlaw search revealed that in that past
two years alone, the federal courts referenced their inherent power in more than 1,900
decisions. The exact search used was: "inherent power" "inherent authority" & DA(AFT
01/01/2003).
95. Id. at 844 ("This pure 'judicial power' consists of applying pre-existing law to the facts
in a particular case, then rendering a final, binding judgment."); see also Evan Caminker,
Allocating the Judicial Power in a "Unified Judiciary," 78 TEx. L. REv. 1513, 1518-21 (2000)
(discussing contours of adjudicatory power); Liebman & Ryan, supra note 33, at 696 (defining
adjudicatory power).
96. See Plaut v.Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 228 (1995) (holding unconstitutional
the congressional attempt to require courts to reconsider final judgments under the Securities
Exchange Act); see also United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 144-47 (1871) (holding
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But as one moves away from the core, the division between judicial and
congressional authority becomes murkier. We inhabit a sphere over which
the judiciary has some species of concurrent jurisdiction. v As Chief Justice
Marshall explained in Wayman v. Southard,95 there can be "no doubt
whatever" that Article I vests in Congress the constitutional power to make
procedural rules for the federal courts. 99 The Court retains no power to
make procedural common law that conflicts with congressional legislation,
yet such legislation appears to be subject to certain limits.'00 In discussing
the contempt power, for example, the Court explained that Congress may
regulate in a manner consistent with that power but may not prohibit its
exercise. I Ol
Closer to the outer edge of the inherent power, Congress may preempt
judicial lawmaking entirely.'0 2 The inherent power jurisprudence suggests
that the Court does not truly share power with Congress in this peripheral
sphere, but rather may exercise authority only in the absence of

unconstitutional a congressional statute that attempted to define the scope of presidential
pardon power and to dictate the outcome in a pending case).
97.
Some scholars have argued that the Supreme Court could have created prospective
procedural rules under the guise of the inherent power had Congress not enacted the
Conformity or Rules Enabling Acts. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, UnconstitutionalRulemaking: The
CivilJustice Reform Act and Separationof Powers, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1283, 1321-24 (1993). Professor
Burbank notes that such power was assumed in the 1926 Senate Report issued in connection
with the precursor legislation to the Rules Enabling Act legislation. See Stephen B. Burbank, The
Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1115 n.454 (1982). Professor Burbank
himself, however, rejects this notion, id. at 1115-21, as does Professor Redish. See Martin H.
Redish, Federal Common Law and American PoliticalTheory: A Response to Professor Weinberg, 83 Nw.
U. L. REv. 853, 858-59 (1989).
98.

23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).

99.

Id. at 22.

100.
See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47-51 (1991) (finding that the
sanctioning authority of the courts was not foreclosed by the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 799 (1987) ("The manner
in which the court's prosecution of contempt is exercised therefore may be regulated by
Congress."); Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chi., 266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924) ("[T]he attributes
which inhere [to the contempt] power and are inseparable from it can neither be abrogated
nor rendered practically inoperative [by Congress]. That it may be regulated within limits not
precisely defined may not be doubted."); see also David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress'
Power Regarding the JudicialBranch, 1999 BYU L. REV. 75, 80, 104-32; Pushaw, supra note 28, at
848 ("[T]he Constitution should be construed as allowing only legislation that facilitates the
courts' exercise of their implied indispensable powers or that reasonably regulates minor details
of such powers.").
101.
See, e.g., Young, 481 U.S. at 799; Michaelson, 266 U.S. at 66; Pushaw, supra note 28, at
767 ("The Court has always conceded congressional authority to regulate contempt but insisted
that it remains a core of inherent power.").
102.
See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) ("Congress retains the
ultimate authority to modify or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure
that are not required by the Constitution.").
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congressional regulation. 10 Forum non conveniens resides in this outermost
sphere; the Court has long acknowledged that Congress may prohibit such
04

dismissals. 1

In his elegant post-Watergate essay, William Van Alstyne proffered a
more limited vision of the judiciary's implied powers.' 0 5 Writing more
recently, Robert Pushaw agreed, advancing a powerful structural argument
that the inherent power of the federal courts extends only to those judicial
innovations "indispensable" to the exercise of the judicial power.'0 6 The
contempt authority, for example, falls within this middle sphere of "implied
indispensable" powers. '° 7 Congress may regulate, but only in a manner
consistent with the exercise of such authority. Both Van Alstyne and Pushaw
conclude, however, that the judiciary has no inherent authority to create
doctrines that are merely "beneficial,' 0 8 or "appropriate and helpful."' 0 9
They argue persuasively that the Constitution assigns such powers to
Congress to distribute as it sees fit pursuant to the Necessary and Proper
Clause." 0
Professor Pushaw places forum non conveniens squarely in the
"beneficial" category and condemns it as an unconstitutional usurpation of
congressional power."' Pushaw acknowledges, however, that the Court has
come a long way down a different path and is unlikely to turn back now. He
103. See Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312-13 (1920); Eash v. Riggins Trucking, 757 F.2d
557, 563-64 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc).
104. AsJustice Rutledge explained in United States v. NationalCity Lines
At least one invariable, limiting principle may be stated. It is that whenever
Congress has vested courts with jurisdiction to hear and determine causes and has

invested complaining litigants with a right of choice among them which is
inconsistent with the exercise by those courts of discretionary power to defeat the
choice so made, the [forum non conveniens] doctrine can have no effect.
334 U.S. 573, 596-97 (1948).
105. See generally William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in DeterminingIncidentalPowers
of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the HorizontalEffect of the Sweeping Clause, 40
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 102 (1976). One of Professor Van Alstyne's most poignant
observations is that the tone of opinions evaluating helpful or appropriate uses of the inherent
power, versus those claiming to be rooted in a specific constitutional grant, is not legal. There is
very little "law" to speak of, and the decisions "read no more judicially' than a good
congressional committee report, because that is essentially what [they are]." Id. at 113.
106. See Pushaw, supra note 28, at 741-43. Professor Pushaw divides the Supreme Court's
inherent authority into three categories: (1) pure "judicial power'"; (2) "'implied
indispensable' powers-those ancillary actions that traditionally have been viewed as absolutely
essential to fulfill the Article III mandate to exercise 'judicial power' as independent 'courts'";
and (3) "'beneficial' powers-those that are merely helpful, useful, or convenient for federal
judges." Id.
107. Id. at 858-59.
108. Id. at 741.
109. Van Alstyne, supra note 105, at 118.
110. See Pushaw, supra note 28, at 743; Van Alstyne, supra note 105, at 118.
111. Pushaw, supranote 28, at 855.
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suggests a middle ground. Pushaw contends that the mere act of
categorizing inherent innovations as either "indispensable" or "beneficial"
would aid the Court (and Congress, no doubt) in its use of the inherent
authority.' 1 2 To this sensible suggestion, I propose an addition: when
operating in the "beneficial," or peripheral, regions of the inherent
authority, the Court should judge congressional activity by a more
deferential standard. Modern inherent power jurisprudence imposes upon
Congress a type of clear statement rule, presuming that Congress legislates
against a backdrop of inherent power "law."" 3 For judicial 4innovations in the
beneficial category, the presumption should be reversed."
The interpretive model employed in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Services, Inc.' 5 supports this position. Allapattah considered the impact of 28
U.S.C. § 1367 on two Supreme Court decisions that required all plaintiffs in
multi-plaintiff diversity actions to meet the amount in controversy
requirements." 6 That Congress was familiar with both precedents is
undisputed; the House Judiciary Committee Report actually cites Zahn v.
International Paper Co.1 7 with apparent approval.'
A literal reading of §
1367(b), however, left open the question of whether Congress had overruled

112.

See id. at 743. Pushaw explains:
This practice of exercising beneficial powers without congressional authorization
should be repudiated. As the Court is unlikely to take this drastic step, however, a
second-best solution would be to require judges to state clearly when they are
exercising powers that are merely beneficial and to acknowledge that such powers
(unlike indispensable ones) are subject to plenary legislative control.

Id.
113. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991) (stating that the Supreme Court
will not "'lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from established principles' such
as the scope of a court's inherent power" when legislating (quoting Weinberger v. RomeroBarcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1798))); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-33 (1962)
(holding that congressional policy and justification for Rule 41 did not demonstrate a clear
enough intent to abrogate traditional authority of the courts); Pushaw, supra note 28, at 759,
785.
114. In the course of a blistering dissent in Chambers, Justice Kennedy exclaimed: "[T]he
Court treats inherent powers as the norm and textual bases of authority as the exception ....
creat[ing] a powerful presumption against congressional control of judicial sanctions. The
Court has the presumption backwards. Inherent powers are the exception, not the rule, and
their assertion requires special justification in each case." Chambers, 501 U.S. at 63-64 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
115. 125 S.Ct. 2611 (2005).
116. The cases at issue in Allapattahwere Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939), and
Zahn v. InternationalPaperCo., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
117. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
118.
Zahn was cited in the House Judiciary Committee Report to support the assertion that
§ 1367(b) was "not intended to affect the jurisdictional requirements of [§ 1332] in diversityonly class actions, as those requirements were interpreted prior to Finley." H.R. REP. No. 101734, at 29 n.17 (1990).
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this important case law by omission.' 1 9 The Allapattah majority found § 1367
"unambiguous" and held that it clearly superseded the case law at issue."O
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy emphasized that "[n] o sound
canon of interpretation requires Congress to speak with extraordinary clarity
in order to modify the rules of federal jurisdiction within appropriate
constitutional bounds. 1 2 ' Neither of the precedents at issue in Allapattah was
a product of the inherent power. From a separation of powers standpoint,
however, it would be absurd if Congress were required to speak with greater
"clarity" to overturn judicially crafted doctrines lying in the beneficial realm
of the inherent power than it must to overturn established statutory
precedent. When the Court acts in the outermost sphere of its inherent
authority, a misinterpretation of congressional regulatory intent is a mistake
of constitutional dimension-a trespass against the Republic. The
deferential approach used in Allapattah should be applied with even greater
conviction in the inherent power arena.
Consider the Court's traditional clear statement approach to inherent
power problems and the tension between forum non conveniens and
congressional court-access statutes. 122 Each time a court dismisses a case on
forum non conveniens grounds, it displaces the congressional value
judgment that the dispute may conveniently be heard by the federal courts.
The Court has avoided this tension by characterizing forum non conveniens
as a "supervening venue provision.'
Gulf Oil and its progeny have treated
the doctrine as both an exception to the venue rules and as the backdrop
against which Congress legislates. The forum non conveniens dismissal
power, therefore, remains untouched by legislative pronouncements unless

119.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) provides:

In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
solely on section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have supplemental
jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made
parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over
claims by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules,
or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the
jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2000).
120. Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2622.
121. Id. at 2620. Responding to the argument that the failure to prohibit supplemental
jurisdiction for additional plaintiffs joined under Rules 20 or 23 was an "unintentional drafting
gap,"Justice Kennedy explained that "it is up to Congress rather than the Courts to fix it." Id. at
2624. The majority was similarly unmoved by the claim that had "Congress understood § 1367
to overrule Zahn, the proposal would have been more controversial." Id. at 2627.
122. In this Article, the terms "court-access statutes" or "court-access regime" are used to
refer to those provisions of the U.S. Code regulating choice of forum such as venue, service of
process, subject matterjurisdiction, removal, transfer, and the like.
123. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994).
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Congress specifically
indicates an intent to override this power in a "special
24
venue" provision.
As explained above, this clear statement approach is not unique to the
forum non conveniens arena. In areas where Congress may regulate
inherent power lawmaking, the Supreme Court presumes that congressional
statutes are enacted against an existing body of inherent power "law." 125 This
creates wide latitude for judicial innovation and a moving target for
Congress. 12 6 A critical flaw in this approach is that it fails to differentiate
among the various inherent power innovations. Such an assumption might
well be legitimate for "indispensable" inherent power doctrines like the
contempt authority, which lie closer to the core judicial power.
But the same presumption about congressional behavior should not
apply across the spectrum ofjudicial inherent power innovation. Underlying
the Court's clear statement approach is a fundamental misunderstanding of
124. The federal courts have conferred immunity against forum non conveniens dismissal
to causes of action filed pursuant to some (but not all) special venue provisions. See Hoffman &
Rowley, supra note 77, at 1146, 1149, 1152-53, 1160. This scrutiny of special venue provisions
originated with Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Kepner, where the Supreme Court found
congressional intent to restrict the use of forum non conveniens dismissals in the special venue
provision of the Federal Employer Liability Act (FELA), which was enacted in 1910. 314 U.S. 44,
53-54 (1941). Shortly thereafter, the Court divined a similar intent in the Clayton Act venue
provision. United States v. Nat'l City Lines, 334 U.S. 573, 586-88 (1948). Following this lead,
many, but not all of the lower courts imbued the special venue provisions of other federal
legislation, such as the Jones Act and the Lanham Act with the congressional intent to foreclose
forum non conveniens dismissals in those cases. Compare Zipfel v. Halliburton Co., 832 F.2d
1477, 1483 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that the Jones Act bars forum non conveniens application),
and Pioneer Prop., Inc. v. Martin, 557 F. Supp. 1354, 1362 (D. Kan. 1983) (insulating the

Lanham Act from forum non conveniens), with Cruz v. Mar. Co. of Phil., 702 F.2d 47, 48 (2d
Cir. 1983) (finding that the Jones Act does not bar application of forum non conveniens), and
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 431 (9th Cir. 1977) (suggesting that
a Lanham Act claim may be dismissed for forum non conveniens).
Other federal legislation containing seemingly identical venue provisions has not
made the cut-the special venue provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), for example, receive no deference from the federal courts. See
Transunion Corp. v. PepsiCo., Inc., 811 F.2d 127, 129-30 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that RICO
claims do not warrant the same deference as does the Clayton Act).
More recently, the First and Second Circuits have taken the position that no federal
venue statutes contain a clear enough expression of congressional intent to prohibit resort to
the forum non conveniens dismissal. Howe v. Goldcorp Invs., Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 948-50 (1st
Cir. 1991); Hoffman & Rowley, supra note 77, at 1164-70 (citing Transunion Corp., 811 F.2d at
130).
125. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991); Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking
"Substantive Rights" (in the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 47, 65
(1998); Pushaw, supranote 28, at 759; Redish, supra note 97, at 858-59; Van Alstyne, supranote
105, at 110.
126. See Pushaw, supra note 28, at 785 ("This interpretive canon makes it virtually
impossible to determine where the judiciary's constitutional control over inherent powers ends
and where Congress's begins."); see also Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the
Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE LJ. 71, 76-79 (1984) (making a similar point in the
context of abstention).
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its relationship with Congress. Toward the periphery of the inherent power,
where inherent power lawmaking is merely "beneficial," the judiciary
regulates this legislatively owned territory at the pleasure of the United
States Congress. The Court, not Congress, is the guest in this realm. It is the
Court, not Congress, who should pay attention to changes in the "legislative
backdrop" that may be at odds with its inherent power creations.
Congress has not enacted a specific forum non conveniens statute
regulating international actions. The Court has treated this omission as
leaving inherent authority "space" for it to occupy. But it is here that we see
why a clear statement rule has no place in the outer reaches of the inherent
power. By focusing myopically on special venue statutes for congressional
intent to prohibit forum non conveniens dismissals, the federal courts have
missed the bigger picture. The current federal forum non conveniens
regime is flatly out of step with a number of congressional regulatory
decisions. Since Gu/f Oil and Piper, Congress has completely revised the
127
general venue statutes to provide for the routine transnational case.
Untold legislative enactments now seek explicitly to regulate extraterritorial
events. 1 ' The Court and Congress have come to a different understanding
of the judiciary's procedural lawmaking power after the revisions to the
Rules Enabling Act in 1988.129 And a more sophisticated Rules of Decision
Act approach better accounts for congressional goals.1 30 The constitutional
borders of the forum non conveniens landscape have shifted. The Court
now stands as a constitutional trespasser.
III. FRICTION ON THE INHERENT POWER FRONTIER WITH CONGRESS

Using the inherent power framework developed above, this section
exposes the friction between Congress and the Court generated by the
forum non conveniens regime. Part A discusses the inherent power
implications of the conflict between the forum non conveniens doctrine and
the congressional venue and transfer scheme. Part B considers the

127. See infra notes 138-49 and accompanying text.
128. Many congressional statutes apply to conduct occurring outside of the United States.
See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2000) (applying extraterritorially "when the
conduct has an effect on American Commerce," as found in MatsushitaElectric Industries Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 n.6 (1986)); Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act, 15
U.S.C. § 6a (2000) (applying extraterritorially, as found in F.Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran,
542 U.S. 155 (2004)); Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000) (applying
extraterritorially, as found in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.1968)); Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd (2000); Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2000)
(applying extraterritorially, as found in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286 (2000));
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000) (overturning EEOC v. Arabian American Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256 (1991) (finding that Congress did not intend Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act to apply extraterritorially)); Trading With the Enemy Act 2000, 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 5 (2005).
129. See infra Part III.C.1.
130. See infra Part III.C.2.
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inconsistency between congressional jurisdiction to prescribe and the lower
federal courts' application of forum non conveniens dismissals to federal
statutory claims. Part C explores the limits on the Court's inherent power
found in the Rules Enabling and the Rules of Decision Acts vis-;I-vis federal
forum non conveniens practice.
A.

VENUE AND TRANSFER

Congress has a long history of regulating venue. The Judiciary Act of
1789 contained an early venue-like provision restricting process to the
district in which the defendant was either an "inhabitant" or could be
"found.' 131 In 1858, Congress enacted what Allan Stein calls "the first true
venuedefe
rule,"1 2 specifically
dants
""
133 limiting the place of trial to the district of the
defendant's residence. Congress amended the general venue provisions in
1888 to allow the diversity plaintiff to lay venue in his home district. 34 And
as part of the 1948 "codification of federal statutory law in the United States
Judicial Code," 35 Congress broadened the definition of corporate residence
in § 1391 thereby increasing the number of districts in which corporations
could be sued. 136 These early general venue provisions required no
relationship between the cause of action and the place of trial for transitory
actions. It was not until 1966 that Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1391 to
authorize federal question and diversity actions to be filed where the cause
137
of action arose.

In 1988 and 1990, Congress again considered the general venue
scheme, completing a comprehensive revision long advocated by the

131. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79. This section provided that "no civil
suit shall be brought before either... [the circuit or district] courts against an inhabitant of the
United States, by any original process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant,
or in which he shall be found at the time of serving the writ." Id. Professor Stein notes that this
provision provided no specific limit upon the place of trial. That restriction would have been
found in the personal jurisdiction jurisprudence of the day, which limited jurisdiction to the
court that issued process. Thus, the federal statute provided no independent venue limitation,
since each federal district at the time encompassed a separate state. See Stein, supra note 16, at
799-800.
132. Stein, supra note 16, at 800.
133. Act of May 4, 1858, ch. 27, 11 Stat. 272, 272 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1391
(2000)).
134. Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, § 1, 25 Stat. 433, 434 (repealed 1990).
135. Stein, supra note 16, at 807.
136. Professor Stein explains that the 1948 provision "finished the work started by [Neirbo
Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1939)] and provided venue against
corporate defendants in any district in which they were doing business, regardless of any formal
appointment of agent as in Neirbo." Stein, supranote 16, at 808.
137. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-714, 80 Stat. 1111, 1111 (amending 28 U.S.C. §
1391 (a), (b), and repealing § 1391 (f)) (amended 1990).
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American Law Institute (ALI)."' The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990139
made several critical changes to the statutory regime:140 it eliminated the
"plaintiffs residence" as a legitimate venue for diversity actions; 14 1

138.

ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS

43-45, 135-40 (1969); seeJohn B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of FederalJurisdiction
and Venue: TheJudicialImprovements Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 735, 769 (1991)
(noting that "[t]he 1990 Act completed a three-stage, three-decade process of eliminating
venue as a significant independent constraint on choice of a federal forum").
139. judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 311, 104 Stat. 5089, 5089
(codifed as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2000)).
140. Prior to the revisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provided in pertinent part:
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship
may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district
where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claims arose.
(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of
citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside,
or in which the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law.
(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or
licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be
regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes.
28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1988) (amended 1990).
The current version of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides in pertinent part:
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship
may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) ajudicial district
where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a
judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to
the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the
action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to
personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in
which the action may otherwise be brought.
(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of
citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a
judicial district where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same
State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the
subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant
may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.
(c) For purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation
shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal
jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced. In a State which has more than
one judicial district and in which a defendant that is a corporation is subject to
personal jurisdiction at the time an action is commenced, such corporation shall
be deemed to reside in any district in that State within which its contacts would be
sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State,
and, if there is no such district, the corporation shall be deemed to reside in the
district within which it has the most significant contacts.
28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2000).
141. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 § 311 (1); see David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1988
and 1990 Revisions of Section 1391, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391, at 8 (1993) (stating that "[a] major
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broadened the transactional venue provisions by replacing the judicial
"district in which the claim arose" with "a judicial district in which a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred"; 42 and added subsections (a)(3) and (b)(3) to deal with the
transnational dispute in which the transaction
occurred abroad but all
143
defendants do not reside in the same state.
The structure and history of the revisions indicate that Congress
addressed the issue of venue for the transnational case. On the
recommendation of the ALI, Congress retained defendant's residence for
both diversity and federal question cases because it "adheres to the
traditional belief that it is fair and convenient to allow suit where the
defendants reside."144 Congress added §§ 1391(a)(3) and (b)(3),
authorizing venue wherever the "defendant[s are] subject to personal
jurisdiction" 145 or "may be found,' 146 to avoid a potential venue gap in cases
in which "no substantial part of the events happened in the United States
and in which all the defendants do not reside in the same state." 147 These
subsections, referred to as "fall-back" provisions in the 1990 House
Committee Report, 148 were enacted just in case a transnational dispute that
arose outside the United States could not be filed in defendant's home state
49
pursuant to subsections (a) (1) or (b) (1).

purpose of the Federal Courts Study Committee was to eliminate the option plaintiffs had in
diversity cases to lay venue in the district of their own residence"). Note that the legislative
history of the revised § 1391 is confusing because the amending bill was catalogued as a House
Report of the Committee on the Judiciary. Id.
142. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 § 311. The 1969 ALI Study recommended that the
"where the claim arose" standard be replaced and recommended that venue be properly laid in
any of the (however many) districts in which had occurred "a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise" to the litigation, or in which was located a "substantial part of the
property" at issue in the litigation. ALI, supra note 138, at 43; see also FED. CTS. STUDY COMM.,
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 94 (1990).
143. See Siegel, supra note 141, at 14 ("[T]he clause is meant to cover the cases in which no
substantial part of the events happened in the United States and in which all the defendants do
not reside in the same state.").
144. H.R. REP. NO. 101-734, at 23 (1990).
145. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(3).
146. Id. § 1391 (b) (3).
147. H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 23. The Report discusses only § 1391(a) (3), but Professor
Oakley ascribes this intent to both §§ 1391 (a)(3) and (b) (3). See Oakley, supra note 138, at 77677.
148. H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 24.
149. It is not clear that §§ 1391(a) (3) and (b)(3) actually provide much of a "fall-back."
The provisions are only relevant to individual defendants since § 1391(c) already defines
corporate residence (for purposes of §§ 1391(a) (1) and (b)(1)) in jurisdictional terms and §§
1391 (a) (3) and (b) (3) are restricted to situations where "there is no district in which the action
may otherwise be brought." 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a)(3), (b)(3). From an inherent power
perspective, however, the wisdom and/or efficacy of the congressional provision should be
irrelevant. The issue is whether congressional goals and those of the inherent power doctrine
overlap.
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The 1990 legislation also broadened the transaction-based venue
choices in §§ 1391 (a) (2) and (b)(2) to allow suit in any district in which "a
substantial part of the events or omissions... occurred."" 0 The predecessor
statute allowed suit "where the cause of action arose." 15 ' The Court had
interpreted this language to encompass only one possible district, 52 thus
generating significant litigation.153 By expanding the transactional venue
language, Congress explicitly rejected the notion that only one appropriate
venue location exists for multi-state or multinational transactions,
recognizing that as a matter of fairness, venue is proper in any district with a
significant connection to the litigation. 154
As part of the comprehensive revisions, Congress in 1988 also rewrote
28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), which defines corporate residence for venue
purposes. '5 The new provision linked corporate venue to personal
jurisdiction in an effort to end litigation over the term "doing business."" 56 It
is not clear that the revisions have succeeded in reducing venue-driven
litigation; however, the new version of § 1391(c) broadened the number of
districts in which trial may be initiated against corporate defendants." 7
To supplement the general venue provisions, Congress has created a
multitude of "special" venue statutes tied to specific types of federal
disputes. 15 The first such venue provision was included in the Federal
Employer Liability Act in 1910 to give plaintiffs greater forum choices in
actions against railroads. 1599 The Clayton,' 66° Sherman, 161 Jones, 162 Lanham,163

150. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 311, 104 Stat. 5089, 5114
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2000)).
151. See supra note 140.
152. See Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 184-85 (1979).
153. The ALI Report referred to the pre-1990 language as a "litigation-breeding phrase."
ALI, supra note 138, at 137.
154. See, e.g.,
Uffner v. La Reunion Francaise, S.A., 244 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2001)
(recognizing the expansion of venue options under the 1990 revisions); First of Mich. Corp. v.
Bramlet, 141 F.3d 260, 263 (6th Cir. 1998) (same); Bates v. C & S Adjusters, Inc., 980 F.2d 865,
866-67 (2d Cir. 1992) (same).
155. SeeJudicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1013, 102
Stat. 4642, 4669 (1988).
156. See supra note 140 (setting forth the pre-1990 version of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)).
157. See David D. Siegel, Changes in FederalJurisdiction and Practice Under the New Judicial
Improvements and Access to JusticeAct, 123 F.R.D. 399, 406 (1989) (noting that the new subdivision
is "even more generous" than the old one, except in a case in a multidistrict state where the
corporate defendant operates in only one district).
158. See Hoffman & Rowley, supra note 77, at 1139 & n. 10.
159. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (2000); see Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 48-50, 53-54
(1941).
160.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
161.
Id. § 4.
162. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (2000).
163.
15 U.S.C. § 1051.
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and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Acts,'64 just to
name a few, all contain specific venue sections. In fact, the ALI in 1969
identified over 330 venue provisions in the United States Code in titles other
than Title 28.165
And in response to the inappropriate venue problem, Congress enacted
the inter-district transfer provisions found at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404 and 1406.
Section 1404(a) authorizes the federal courts to transfer civil cases within
the federal system "[flor the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice."'6 Section 1406 applies to cases "laying venue in the
wrong ... district" and 167
authorizes the district courts to dismiss or transfer "in
the interest ofjustice."

As the previous discussion explains, Congress has actively regulated
venue in some form since the creation of the lower federal courts in 1789.
Venue, like subject matter jurisdiction, has ramifications that extend beyond
the courthouse steps. "Venue is often a vitally important matter."' 68 As
Professor Whitten explains, "the location of civil actions has significant
implications for the burdens that will be endured by different classes of
litigants. " ' 69 Congress appears to understand this and has long treated venue
as an issue requiring legislative resolution.
1. The Relevance of 28 U.S.C. § 1404
Congress had shown serious interest in the inappropriate venue
problem for some time before Gulf Oil was released. After the Court held in
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Kepner 70 that the venue provision in FELA
was mandatory,' 7 1 forum-shopping attorneys from urban centers attracted
congressional attention. During the 1947 House debates on the Jennings
Bill, 172 several congressmen condemned tactics used by New York and
Chicago attorneys to obtain cases at the expense of the rural bar.173 The
Jennings Bill, which would have restricted forum choice in FELA actions,

164.
165.
166.

18 U.S.C. § 1965 (2000).
ALI, supra note 138, app. at 498-501.
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000).

167.

Id. § 1406(a).

168. Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 39 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia explained that "[v]enue is often a vitally important matter, as is shown by the frequency
with which parties contractually provide for and litigate the issue. Suit might well not be
pursued, or might not be as successful, in a significantly less convenient forum." Id. at 39-40.
169. Ralph U. Whitten, Separation of Powers Restrictions on JudicialRulemaking: A Case Study of
FederalRule 4, 40 ME. L. REv. 41, 64 (1988).
170. 314 U.S. 44 (1941).

171.
172.

Id. at 54.
SeeH.R. 1639,80th Cong. § 7 (1st Sess. 1947); 93 CONG. REC. 9178,9178-94 (1947).

173.

See Stein, supranote 16, at 806.
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174
failed. But by the time the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gulf Oil,
Congress was engaged in "the codification of federal statutory law in the
United States Judicial Code" 175 and was actively debating what would later
become 28 U.S.C. § 1404.176
Considered in this light, Gulf Oil looks like a bold incursion into
congressional territory. As an inherent power matter, it is hard to argue that
forum non conveniens dismissal power was "necessary to the exercise of all
other"judicial powers. Justice Black, joined byJustice Rutledge, complained
bitterly that the Court had no discretion to decline an otherwise properly
filed case at law.177 Questioning the propriety of inherent power lawmaking
in this context, Black observed:

It may be that a statute should be passed authorizing the federal
district courts to decline to try so-called common law cases
according to the convenience of the parties. But whether there
should be such a statute, and determination of its scope and the
safeguards which should surround it, are, •in178 my judgment,
questions of policy which Congress should decide.
The majority, however, was untroubled by the inherent power issue. As
Professor Stein notes, "abstention was the order of the day."' 79 During the
previous decade, the Court had
• 180toyed with a number of doctrines as a means
of alleviating docket tensions. Writing for the Gulf Oil majority, Justice
Jackson reviewed the many instances in which the federal courts had
declined jurisdiction and concluded that the general venue statutes had
never acted as a constraint upon the judiciary's discretionary dismissal
authority."'
With the 1948 enactment of § 1404, however, the federal forum non
conveniens doctrine should have died a natural death. Section 1404 forms
the legislative response to the very dilemma faced by the Gulf Oil Court. The
House Committee Report, amended after Gulf Oil was decided, 18 states that
the statute "was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non
conveniens." 8 3 Though the actual purpose of § 1404 was to overrule

174.
(1946).
175.

Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 153 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. granted, 328 U.S. 830
Stein, supra note 16, at 807.

176. The court of appeals in Gulf Oil declined to embrace the forum non conveniens
doctrine because Congress was then debating the transfer measure. GulfOil, 153 F.2d at 886.
177. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 515 (BlackJ., dissenting).
178. Id.
179. Stein, supra note 16, at 808.
180. Id. at 795-96, 803-06.
181.
Gulf Oi4 330 U.S. at 507-08.
182. Stein, supra note 16, at 807 (calling this "a creative bit of retroactive legislative
history").
183. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a), at 159 (Supp. 2005) (Historical and Statutory Notes).
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Kepner,184 the critical point from the inherent power perspective is that

Congress embraced a different solution to the Gulf Oil problem than did the
Court. Section 1404 responds to the inappropriate forum choice issue by
vesting the federal courts with the discretion to transfer cases within the
federal system. Congress could have embraced the forum non conveniens
dismissal. And given the tenor of the congressional debates regarding
questionable use of venue by urban lawyers, one might have expected
something more punitive. Yet Congress authorized
only transfer, thus
85
implicitly rejecting the remedy adopted by the Court.1
Had the Court employed an appropriately deferential analysis, the
advent of § 1404 would have precluded further use of the forum non
conveniens doctrine. 6 The lower federal courts, however, rejected the
notion that § 1404 overruled Gulf Oil, ascribing to Congress the intent to
displace forum non conveniens dismissal authority only in circumstances
where the alternative forum was federal, thus leaving the doctrine intact with
respect to international disputes.18 7 Piper continued on this course by
insisting that Van Dusen v. Barrack,

which held that Congress intended to

preserve plaintiff's choice of law advantage in § 1404 cases, 8 9 had no place

in the forum non conveniens decision. 90 justice Marshall explained that if

184. Stein, supra note 16, at 807.
185. In 1955, the Supreme Court in Norwood v. Kirkpatrick held that § 1404(a) was, in fact,
.an entirely new section." 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955). The decision explained that Congress "was
revising as well as codifying. The harshest result of the application of the old doctrine of forum
non conveniens, dismissal of the action, was eliminated by the provision in § 1404(a) for
transfer." Id. The Court thus concluded that "[w]hen the harshest part of the doctrine is
excised by statute, it can hardly be called mere codification." ld Returning to the congressionalintent theme five years later in Hoffman v. Blaski, the Court read § 1404 to allow transfer only to
a district in which the plaintiff could have filed the case as an original matter, a restriction at
odds with the alternative forum requirements in the forum non conveniens context. 363 U.S.
335, 344 (1960).
186. Professor Stein puts a different gloss on the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1404. He notes
that § 1404 and the 1948 version of§ 1391 (c):
Taken together . . . represent a legislative abdication of control over the place of
trial. The 1948 Code first expanded plaintiffs' choice of forums, then hedged that
choice by allowing the courts to frustrate it whereever they thought it appropriate.
The Code got Congress out of the business of specifying the appropriate place of
trial and delegated that task to the courts.
Stein, supra note 16, at 808. I agree that with the enactment of § 1404, Congress may well have
gotten "out of the business" of trying to designate the best place for litigation, but like other
delegation legislation, § 1404 puts limits on the courts' authority. Congress authorized only
transfer and stopped short of empowering the courts to dismiss on convenience grounds.
187. See, e.g., Howe v. Goldcorp Invs., Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 947-48 (1st Cir. 1991); Vanity Fair
Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 645 (2d Cir. 1956); Fiorenza v. U.S. Steel Int'l, Ltd.,
311 F. Supp. 117, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
188. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
189. Id. at 624.
190. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253-54 (1981).
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"substantial weight were given to the possibility of a change in law, the forum
non conveniens doctrine would become virtually useless." 91
2.

The Impact of the 1988 and 1990 Revisions

Regardless of whether one concludes that the Court acted within the
scope of its inherent power in Gulf Oil and Piper, venue presents a
compelling example of a situation where the "legislative backdrop" has
changed. The stated purpose of the 1988 and 1990 revisions was to
"eliminat[e] venue as a significant independent constraint on choice of a
federal forum. " 192 The tenor of the legislation suggests that Congress was
untroubled by forum shopping. The decision to equate venue and personal
jurisdiction for corporate defendants is particularly interesting; Congress
must not have seen national and multinational corporations as needing
forum protection beyond that provided by personal jurisdiction. Granted,
one could argue that because Congress expected forum non conveniens to
93
operate in the international realm, it had no reason to address the issue.'
The problem with that position, however, is that it finds no support in the
14
195
language,' 94 design,
or legislative history'196 of the statutes. The decisions
insisting that the general venue statutes do not preclude forum non
conveniens dismissals 97 are no different from the subject matter jurisdiction
precedents at issue in Allapattah, which the Court concluded had been
unambiguously overruled by 28 U.S.C. § 1367.98 The argument that the
revisions to § 1391 overruled the Piper version of forum non conveniens is
even stronger than the argument embraced by the Allapattah majority:
Congress unambiguously extended venue options against corporations,

191.

Id,
at 250.

192.
193.

Oakley, supranote 138, at 769.
I am indebted to Professor Allan Stein for this argument. I suspect that as a political

matter, Professor Stein may be correct. From an inherent power perspective, however, we have
only congressional silence to go on. There is no indication that Congress approved the
Supreme Court's forum non conveniens regime for international cases.
194.

The language is unambiguous in that it applies to all civil cases in the United States

courts. Moreover, the residence language has remained essentially intact since at least 1858 and
was specifically retained by the latest revision. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 (a) (1), (b) (1) (2000).
195. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress added the
"safety net" provisions in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 (a) (3) and (b) (3) to deal with disputes arising from
overseas events).
196. See supra notes 144-54 and accompanying text (discussing the structure and history of
the amendments).
197.

See, e.g., Ferguson v. Ford Motor Co., 77 F. Supp. 425, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) ("Since the

principle of forum non conveniens is applicable in the absence of legislative mandate to the
contrary, the search is not for evidence that the Congress intended it to apply, but that it
intended it not to apply.").
198. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2615 (2005). Allapattah
overruled Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), and Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306

U.S. 583 (1939). Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2622, 2627.
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broadened transactional venue, and provided for cases involving
extraterritorial events. And unlike the Allapattah situation, 99 the legislative
history of the 1988 and 1990 venue revisions does not mention "forum non
conveniens" or the cases applying the doctrine.2 °0
Referring
•.•,,201to the forum non conveniens doctrine as a "supervening
venue provision,
the federal judiciary has declined to follow the
congressional lead. The courts routinely dismiss international cases on
forum non conveniens grounds that were filed in the district where the
defendant resides. As mentioned above, Congress retained this venue
preference in the 1990 Act on the advice of the ALI as the one locale that is
"inherently fair." The statute requires no identity of residence and the
litigation-inducing events. Congress recognized, moreover, that transactions
giving rise to the dispute may well have occurred extraterritorially and
created202§§ 1391 (a) (3) and (b) (3) as backup rules for the transnational
action.

Juxtapose the congressional approach with that of the federal courts. In
Iragorri v. United Technologies Corp.,2° 3 for example, a Florida plaintiff sued
Otis Elevator at its corporate headquarters in Connecticut for injuries
arising from an accident in Colombia. 204 The tort action was not particularly
unusual. Otis raised a defense typical to products liability cases-it claimed
that another party's failure to maintain (here a previously owned affiliate)
was the cause of the accident. 2°5 The district court dismissed the case on
206
forum non conveniens grounds. The opinion makes no mention of the
1990 revisions. The district judge merely observed that the witnesses and
207
evidence regarding the accident were outside of the United States. Surely,
these characteristics inhere to almost every case arising from overseas events
in which the defendant is sued in the district where it resides. And just as
surely, Congress realized this when it revised the general venue statutes.

199. Zahn was cited in the House Judiciary Committee Report to support the assertion that
§ 1367(b) was "not intended to affect the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in
diversity-only class actions, as those requirements were interpreted prior to Finley." H.R. REP.
No. 101-734, at 29 n.17 (1990).
200. See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 23 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 70 (1988); ALI,
supra note 138, at 43-45, 135-40; FED. CTs. STUDY COMM., supra note 142, at 94.
201. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994).
202. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
203. 274 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc).
204. Id. at 70. In their original complaint, the plaintiffs named as defendants International
Elevator ("IE"), Otis, and United Technologies. IE obtained severance and transfer to the
District of Maine. Iragorri v. Int'l Elevator, Inc., 203 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 2000). IE then moved
for dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds. The district court granted the motion, and the
First Circuit affirmed. Id. at 11, 17-18.
205. Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 285 F. Supp. 2d 230, 245-47 (D. Conn. 2003).
206. Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 46 F. Supp. 2d 159, 169 (D. Conn. 1999).
207. Id. at 164-65.
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Iragorri,though reversed on appeal,2 08 is typical. The federal courts have

embraced a "situs rule" for transnational cases, preferring the site of
plaintiff's injury to the American forum. The situs rule is not restricted to
actions filed pursuant to §§ 1391 (a) (1) and (b) (1). The courts also apply the
judicially created "situs rule" as a matter of course to cases where significant
dispute-related events occurred in the United States in spite of the revisions
to §§ 1391(a) (2) and (b) (2).
Lueck v. Sundstrand Corp.209 provides a good example of the operation of
the situs rule in the transactional venue context. The case involved an air
disaster in New Zealand. The complaint alleged, among other things, that a
defect in the radio altimeter caused the crash. The radio altimeter in
question had been designed and manufactured by defendant Honeywell
Corporation in Arizona. The action was filed in Arizona. And although
"crucial documents and witnesses" could be found in "both fora," the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case on forum non conveniens
grounds. 210 Similarly, in the myriad Ford Explorer rollover cases filed in
districts where the products were designed or manufactured, Ford and
Bridgestone/Firestone mounted intense forum non conveniens attacks to
foreign rollover claims, contending that only the accident sites were
appropriate locations for litigation. 2 1 Though the plaintiffs ultimately
prevailed in the multidistrict action,212 the defendants' motions provoked a
time-consuming search for the best forum in run-of-the-mill transnational
products liability actions, 213 as well as an opinion from the Seventh Circuit
214
None of these opinions
Court of Appeals denying a writ of mandamus.
acknowledged the congressional judgment that venue is usually fair where a
"substantial portion of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim
occurred." 215 Congressional efforts to streamline transactional venue appear
to have been in vain; the federal courts have adopted their own litigationbreeding rule for transnational disputes in the form of forum non
conveniens. 216

208. See generally Iragorri, 274 F.3d 65 (vacating and remanding for improper balancing of
forum non conveniens factors). Although the Second Circuit reversed, the First Circuit held
that the case was appropriately dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. Int'l Elevator., 203
F.3d at 10.
209. 236 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2001).
210. 1& at 1146.
211.
See generally In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 190 F. Supp. 2d
1125 (S.D. Ind. 2002).
212. Id. at 1156.
213. The district court opinion rejecting the consolidated forum non conveniens motions
is thirty pages long. See generally id.

214. In reFord Motor Co., 344 F.3d 648, 655 (7th Cir. 2002).
215. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a) (2), (b)(2) (2000).
216. See generally In re Air Crash over Taiwan Straits on May 25, 2002, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1176
(C.D. Cal. 2004) (dismissing a case against Boeing filed in the Central District of California,
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The judiciary candidly admits that its decision to embrace the situs
model stems from its hostility to intercontinental forum shopping.2 1 v The
lure of the American jury, the joy of American discovery, and the ease of
contingent fee arrangements all conspire to draw a foreign plaintiff to our
courts "[a]s a moth is drawn to the light., 218 Such cases may indeed strain
the resources of the federal courts. But the issue here is not the wisdom of
the judiciary's venue regime for transnational disputes, but whether it
represents an appropriate use of the inherent power vis-a-vis Congress. It
may be that the federal venue statutes have never "promote [d] trial in the
fairest, most efficient, or most convenient forum,"21 9 but it is hard to argue
that Congress did not consider fairness, efficiency, and convenience when
drafting them. If the federal courts may constitutionally exercise forum non
conveniens dismissal power at all, they must do so in a manner consistent
with the underlying premises of the congressional venue enactments.
Congress provided for the routine transnational dispute.220 Congress
eliminated "plaintiffs home" from the statute.22' Congress rejected the situs
rule.222 At a minimum, the judiciary must treat congressional venue choices
as presumptively correct, confining forum non conveniens scrutiny to truly
unusual cases or, to quote Gulf Oil, "rare" situations that Congress did not
contemplate. Garden-variety international disputes involving events overseas
no longer qualify as "rare" in today's global economy.
B. JURISDICTION TO PRESCRIBE

Forum non conveniens dismissals in disputes governed by United States
statutory law present a head-on conflict with Congress. Without question,
Congress has the constitutional power to create legislation that regulates
conduct abroad. 223 Once a court concludes that Congress has sought to
where design occurred, on forum non conveniens grounds); Gorling v. Chrysler, No. 96-CV70137-DT, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10968 (E.D. Mich. May 30, 1996) (granting a forum non

conveniens motion in an action involving a Canadian accident, even though complaint alleged
a design and manufacturing defect and jeep was both designed and manufactured in the
Eastern District of Michigan where the action was filed).
217. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 251-52 (1981); Iragorri v. United
Tech. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 71-72 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc).
218. Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch, (1983) 1 W.L.R. 730, 733 (C.A. 1982). The

entire quote reads: "As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States."
Id.
219. Stein, supra note 16, at 801.
220. See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
221. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 311(1), 104 Stat. 5089,
5114.
222. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
223. FTC v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1323 (D.C. Cir.
1980). The court explained:
[Although] courts are bound wherever possible to construe strictly federal statutes
conferring subject matter jurisdiction on domestic agencies to avoid possible
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regulate the event in dispute, there is no place for a forum non conveniens
inquiry to operate. The very questions central to the forum non conveniens
assessment have already been answered by the democracy.
Consider a hypothetical congressional statute prohibiting "any act
abroad that (1) has a significant impact on stock registered on one of the
United States securities exchanges and (2) is detrimental to the interests of
American investors. ' , 224 By definition, a breach of this federal statute will
involve events that occurred outside of the United States. It should come as
no surprise that witnesses and evidence of the defendant's alleged
wrongdoing will be beyond the subpoena power of the federal courts.
Similarly, impleading potentially liable third parties might well be
impossible. By enacting the legislation, Congress has asserted a national
interest in the case appropriate for a United States court or jury. When a
court undertakes to balance the public and private interests through a
forum non conveniens inquiry, it rides roughshod over the democracy's
decision to regulate the transnational event.
The Supreme Court's approach to jurisdiction to prescribe or,
"prescriptive comity," has evolved over the past decade. In 1993, the Court
decided Hartford FireInsurance Co. v. California, in which all Justices agreed
that the Sherman Act regulated extraterritorial conduct. 2 5 The majority and

dissent divided sharply, however, over the proper framework for the
jurisdiction to prescribe inquiry and thus the extent of the Sherman Act's
reach. Justice Souter, writing for the majority, suggested that the judiciary
has the power to decline "subject matter jurisdiction" over cases that create
"226
serious conflicts with other nations as a matter of international "comity.
Finding no such conflict, the Court upheld the exercise ofjurisdiction in the
227
case.
In dissent,
Justice
whatit
"sujec
clle Scalia argued
.... that the
..
228majority erred by considering
what it called "subject matter jurisdiction." The dissenting opinion treats

conflicts with contrary principles of international law ..... courts of the United
States are nevertheless obligated to give effect to an unambiguous exercise by
Congress of its jurisdiction to prescribe even if such an exercise would exceed the
limitations imposed by international law.

Id.
224. This hypothetical statute is fashioned from Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, in which the
Second Circuit found the Securities Exchange Act to apply extraterritorially. 54 F.3d 118, 123
(2d Cir. 1995).
225. 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).
226. Id. at 798-99.
227. Id. The finding of "no conflict" has provoked criticism from the academic community.
See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Case Two: ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Law Against United
States and Alien Defendants (Sherman Act), 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 577, 597 (1995); Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Conflict, Balancingof Interests, and the Exercise ofJurisdiction to Prescribe:Reflections on the
InsuranceAntitrust Case, 89 AM.J. INT'L L. 42, 45-46 (1995).
228. HartfordFire,509 U.S. at 813 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
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the entire case as a jurisdiction to prescribe problem, asking first whether
Congress intended to regulate extraterritorial conduct at all and then
whether the statute covered the specific conduct at issue. In other words, the
dissent found that simply determining that the Sherman Act applied to
extraterritorial conduct was not enough; the question of the statute's
application to the acts in question remained open. 229 Relying on the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, 230 Justice Scalia concluded that
Congress had not intended to reach the conduct at issue when it passed the
Sherman Act. 231' The dissent would therefore have dismissed the case for

failure to state a claim as opposed to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The difference between the Hartford Fire majority and dissent is more
than semantic. Justice Souter's opinion treats the question as a species of
abstention. 232 The Court determines for itself the relative wisdom of
adjudicating any case of extraterritorial malfeasance in which foreign
interests are implicated. The Court may therefore dismiss a case any time it
concludes that Congress has weighed the competing international interests
incorrectly. Such a regime is a straightforward usurpation of congressional
authority. The dissent, on the other hand, focuses solely on congressional
intent: if a particular application of a statute goes too far as a matter of
international comity, the Court simply assumes that Congress did not intend
to regulate that conduct. The advantage of the dissenting approach is that it
does not rely on the inherent power, but instead upon basic statutory
construction. It thus avoids casting the Court in the role of diplomat.
F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran,1 3 decided in the summer of 2004,
seems to have laid to rest the ideological disagreement. Without discussing
the Souter-Scalia debate, Justice Breyer's majority opinion applies the
interpretive approach championed by the Hartford Fire dissent. The Court
ascertained the scope of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act by
straightforward statutory interpretation, attributing comity concerns to
Congress in the enactment of the legislation.234

229. Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
230. Id. at 818 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAw §§ 403(1), (2) (1987)).
231. Id. at 819 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
232. In fact, the comity approach suggested by Justice Souter is more constitutionally
offensive than traditional abstention. In an abstention case, the district court must officially
abstain. In addition, the case will be heard in a United States court, albeit one in a state system.

Justice Souter's approach is less deferential, essentially saying to Congress, "sorry, we think you
made a mistake," without even acknowledging the congressional intent to regulate. And while
the Constitution does not explicitly commit federalism concerns to any one branch, the foreign
relations powers are enumerated in Articles I and II. Justice Souter's comity approach, thus,
operates in the teeth of constitutional provisions vesting regulatory decisions regarding foreign
relations in branches other than the judiciary.
233. 542 U.S. 155 (2004).

234.

Id. at 164-65.
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Though the Supreme Court has embraced the better approach to
jurisdiction to prescribe in Empagran, the inherent power difficulties in the
forum non conveniens arena remain. Congressional jurisdiction to prescribe
and forum non conveniens are on a collision course.235 Once a court
concludes that Congress intended to regulate a specific transnational event,
there exists no principled method by which to balance the relevant public
and private factors without countermanding the congressional judgment
that the event deserves federal attention. The judiciary has sidestepped this
confrontation by concentrating on the strength of "special" venue
provisions, 6 ignoring the original congressional decision to regulate the
extraterritorial conduct in dispute. The courts thus miss the point, focusing
on the peripheral aspect of the legislation rather than its central premise.
Once Congress has decided to regulate the extraterritorial event being
litigated, the case becomes just like any other federal question case-subject
to inter-system transfer under § 1404-but not subject to dismissal because a
federal court feels that its time and effort would be better spent on domestic
issues. The Constitution left that call to Congress, and Congress made it.
C. THE RuLEs ENABLING ACTAND THE RULES OFDECISIONACT
The Rules Enabling Act"' ("REA") and the Rules of Decision Act23s are
also relevant to the scope of the Court's inherent power, representing efforts
by Congress to minimize friction between the federal courts and Congress,
and the federal courts and the States, respectively. Together they form the
outer limits of judicial innovation on the procedural front. The Rules
Enabling Act establishes a detailed mechanism through which the Court
may create procedural law with input from Congress, reserving to Congress
the right to enact prospective federal legislation implicating substantive
rights. Similarly, the Rules of Decision Act extends protection to state

235. Several fine scholars have previously identified the tension between forum non
conveniens and jurisdiction to prescribe. In 1986, Professor Margaret Stewart explained that
the jurisdiction to prescribe analysis set forth in Timberlane, similar to that adopted by the
Restatement (Third) of ForeignRelations, obviated the need for the forum non conveniens doctrine.
See generally Stewart, supra note 22. In 2002, Professors Rowley and Hoffman examined the use
of forum non conveniens in federal statutory cases and concluded that while forum non
conveniens should still be available for the unusual case, choice of law should be the driving
factor in the analysis. See Hoffman & Rowley, supra note 77, at 1197-99. They propose "taking
sovereign interests seriously," and suggest in federal statutory cases that only those situations in
which a foreign sovereign has a greater interest should be subject to forum non conveniens
dismissal. Id. at 1199. Hoffman and Rowley appear to embrace a comity-based approach similar
to that of Justice Souter in HartfordFire.As explained above, the Constitution does not give the
courts the inherent power to second guess a congressional decision to regulate certain events. If
the legislation is constitutional and Congress in fact intended to regulate the very conduct at
issue, there is no room for an inherent power to dismiss to operate.
236. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
237. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000).
238. Id. § 1652.

HeinOnline -- 91 Iowa L. Rev. 1180 2005-2006

CONGRESS, FEDERAL COURTS & FORUM NON CONVENJENS

1181

lawmaking beyond that constitutionally required by Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins. 3" 9 While Congress may enact substantive or procedural statutes
that displace the substantive law of the States, the Rules of Decision Act
prohibits the Court from doing so under the guise of the inherent power.
1. The Rules Enabling Act
In 1934, Congress delegated to the Court
the power to create
,,.240
prospective rules of "practice and procedure.
The Act contains certain
limiting language restricting the Supreme Court to Rules that do not
"abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."2 41 Absent congressional
intervention, proposed Rules and amendments transmitted by the Court
before May 1st become effective December 1st of the same year.242
The very existence of the REA rulemaking mechanism obviates the
need to rely upon the inherent power in cases like forum non conveniens.
"Strict necessity," long hailed by the Court as the prerequisite for inherent
authority innovation, 243 is lacking. This is not to say that the judiciary is
precluded from using its inherent power in the procedural arena; such a
position is as nonsensical as it is ahistorical. 244 But the availability of the
rulemaking process suggests that the Court should confine inherent power
lawmaking to unusual situations-instances in which proposing a formal
rule is either inappropriate or where the issue involved comes up
239. 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938).
240. Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 415, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
2072(b)).
241. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
242. The Judicial Conference has been in charge of "carrying on a continuous study of the
operation and effect of the general rules of practice and procedure" since 1958. Act of July 11,
1958, Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356, 356 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331). The procedure by
which new Rules are created is as follows:
An Advisory Committee drafts proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which are reviewed by a Standing Committee on Rules and Procedures,
and then by the Judicial Conference. The proposed amendments are then sent to
the Supreme Court, which transmits them to Congress before May 1 of the year in
which they are to become effective. Congress has until December 1 to act, and if it
does nothing, the amendments become effective.
Kelleher, supra note 125, at 89-90; see also H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 26-27 (1988). For a more
personal perspective, see Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking, 75
JUDICATURE 161, 164-65 (1991) (relating the process by which new rules of procedure are
affirmed).
243. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 819-22 (1987) (noting that
inherent powers "'are necessary to the exercise of all others'" (quoting United States v. Hudson,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 31, 34 (1812))); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980)
(same).
244. See Mullenix, supra note 97, at 1297 ("The judicial power of the federal courts includes
and has always included the power to prescribe internal procedural rules for the conduct of
litigation in the federal courts."); Pushaw, supra note 28, at 850 ("[T]he Constitution
contemplates shared power over adjective law.").
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infrequently. In the forum non conveniens area neither of these conditions
exists. Here we have the routine use of a judicially crafted "housekeeping"
rule to dismiss a certain class of otherwise appropriately filed lawsuits.
Failure to use the Rules Enabling Act procedure circumvents the
congressional oversight and feedback envisioned by the legislation.
Although Congress evinced no interest in the rulemaking process for the
first thirty-five years that the Act was in force, 2 45 more recent congressional
actions suggest that it takes its oversight role quite seriously. Since 1973,
when Congress declined to approve the proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 246 Congress and the Court have engaged in a number of
skirmishes involving the disapproval, delay, or revision of proposed Rules or
amendments. 247 In 1988, Congress revised the Rules Enabling Act to extend
significantly the time frame for public consideration of proposed Rules. 248
The 1990s saw even greater congressional activism on the procedural front:
the completion of a major overhaul of the federal venue provisions, 249
serious scrutiny of new discovery and class action proposals (among
others)251,50 and even passage of special pleading rules for a special interest
group.
Regardless of whether one approves of Congress's interest in
federal court procedure, evading congressional oversight by relying on the
inherent power is disrespectful.

245. See Kelleher, supra note 125, at 55.
246. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9, 9 (requiring affirmative
congressional approval for the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence). After a debate about
whether the rules of evidence fell within the Enabling Act delegation, Congress suspended the
enactment of the rules until such time as it affirmatively chose to adopt them. Catherine T.
Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,150 U. PA. L. REV.
1099, 1107-08 n.16 (2002).
247. See Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Expressly Repudiating Implied Repeals Analysis: A New
Frameworkfor Resolving Conflicts Between CongressionalStatutes and Federal Rules, 51 EMORY L.J. 677,
677 (2002) (taking note of the increasing role of Congress); Kelleher, supra note 125, at 51-57
(cataloguing the debate over such concerns as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act). See generally Paul D. Carrington, Learningfrom the Rule
26 Brouhaha:Our Courts Need Real Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295 (1994) (providing a general history of
judicial rulemaking and the increase of congressional activity in rulemaking).
248. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2000); see also David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1988 Revision,
reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. § 2074 (West 1994) ("Under subdivision (a) of the new § 2074, May 1st
remains the deadline before which new rules must be submitted, but Congress now has at least
seven months instead ofjust three in which to consider them.").
249. See supra notes 138-54 and accompanying text.
250. See Kelleher, supra note 125, at 56-57 & nn.43-48. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Hope
over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795
(1991) (cataloguing difficulties over promulgation of new discovery rules).
251.
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995). Congressional interest was so great, in fact, that both the House, 141 CONG. REc. 37,807
(1995), and the Senate, 141 CONG. REc. 38,354 (1995), overrode a presidential veto of the
proposed Act.
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Proper regard for separation of powers suggests that whenever a judgemade procedure sees frequent use and has a significant impact on litigation
results, the Court should invoke the REA rulemaking process. Federal forum
non conveniens falls squarely within this description. Such motions are the
norm in transnational litigation. When the doctrine was introduced in 1947,
federal courts rarely made use of these dismissals. In the first year of its
judicially created life, forum non conveniens appeared in four reported
252
federal court
opinions.
In the
year
2003
alone, the doctrine was discussed
"•
•
253
inift-thre
a lest
fderl
in at least fifty-three federal decisions. A forum non conveniens dismissal
has a significant impact on the outcome of the dispute, in most cases
sounding a death knell to the plaintiffs case. The Court exceeds its inherent
power by eschewing the Rules Enabling Act procedures in the forum non
conveniens context. Congress
created a rulemaking mechanism; the Court
254
should be obliged to use it.
The Rules Enabling Act also contains a key limitation on the Court's
creativity when fashioning procedural rules. Subsection 2072(b) of the Act
restricts the judiciary to Rules that do "not abridge, enlarge or modify any
25
substantive
Many scholars agree
,,25625 right." 1

that

"Congress's animating

concern
when adding this language was separation of powers. 257 As
Professor Leslie Kelleher observes, "Congress retained for itself exclusive
authority to make federal law that 'modifies, abridges, or enlarges
substantive rights.' 258 Any formal rule created under the Act exceeding this
limit would presumably be invalid.2 59
252. Performing a Westlaw standard search for cases handed down in the one-year period
following Gulf Oil revealed that only four federal cases implicated forum non conveniens. The
exact search used was: (170BK45 106K28 401K52) & DA(AFT 01/01/1948) & DA(BEF
01/01/1949).
253. A search restricted to cases decided between January 1, 2003 and January 1, 2004 using
Westlaw's standard search revealed fifty-three cases involving forum non conveniens in the
federal courts. The exact search used was: (170BK45 106K28 401K52) & DA(AFT 01/01/2003)
& DA(BEF 01/01/2004).

254. Cf Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 60-65 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
255.
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000).
256. Kelleher, supra note 125, at 93.
257.
Id. Professor Stephen Burbank is widely credited with having debunked the notion
that the "substantive rights" reference in the Rules Enabling Act was directed primarily to
federalism concerns. See Paul D. Carrington & Derek P. Apanovitch, The ConstitutionalLimits of
Judicial Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass-Tort Settlements Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23, 39
ARIZ. L. REv. 461, 477-79 (1997) (noting that Congress's intent was to delegate only a portion
of its power to the courts); Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Court'sRole in Interpreting the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1042-46 (1993) (same). See generally Burbank,
supranote 97.
258. Kelleher, supra note 125, at 94 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)). To support this point,
Kelleher analyzes the legislative history of the 1988 revisions to the Rules Enabling Act.
Regarding the 1985 House Report, she observes:
First, the Committee emphasized, the Act "contains independent limitations on...
court rulemaking" above and beyond the constitutional limits on Congress' power
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Given that Congress reserved to itself the exclusive right to create
procedural law that encroaches on substantive rights, it would be very odd
indeed if the Court could evade this restriction simply by relying on its
inherent power. This limitation should be just as applicable to "beneficial"
rules of procedure created by the Court as it is to Rules formally proposed to
Congress. In the outer reaches of the inherent power, the REA
substance/procedure line provides a good proxy for congressional
permission to regulate.' 60 As Professor Burbank explained in his seminal
history of the Act, Congress enacted § 2072(b) in an effort to "allocate policy
choices-to determine which federal lawmaking body, the Court or
Congress, shall decide whether there will be federally enforceable rights
26 1
regarding the matter in question and the content of those rights."
Beneficial doctrines like forum non conveniens are nothing more than
straightjudicial policy choices. Particularly here, where the judicially crafted
doctrine has the same force as a Rule, 262 the Court should respect the
division of lawmaking authority envisioned by Congress.
It is thus worth considering whether the existing forum non conveniens
doctrine modifies, abridges, or enlarges substantive rights in a way that
exceeds the limits set forth by the Rules Enabling Act. 26 3 This is no easy task.
For many years, the Court treated the Rules Enabling Act as having
to regulate procedure, and that Congress had delegated "only a portion of [its]
power" in the Rules Enabling Act. Second, the Committee noted that the

prohibition against Rules affecting substantive rights is not solely a federalism
concern. Rather, it protects Congress' lawmaking prerogative not just in cases in
which state substantive law provides the rule of decision, but also reserves to
Congress its ability to regulate in purely federal matters, such as bankruptcy. Third,
the Committee emphasized that the allocation of powers between Congress and
the Court was of primary importance, so that the substantive rights limitation is
intended to protect not just lawmaking that already has occurred, but also
prospective lawmaking.
Id. at 102-03 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 21 (1985)) (citations omitted).

259.

I say "presumably" because the Supreme Court has yet to invalidate a Federal Rule

promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act.
260. As explained in detail in Part II, this Article advocates for the abandonment of a clear

statement standard in the outer reaches of the inherent power. Under my approach, the
Supreme Court should ensure that congressional regulatory goals are unaffected by the

inherent power innovation. The Rules Enabling Act substance/procedure dichotomy provides a
constitutional heads up that Congress may be uncomfortable with judicial creativity beyond that
authorized by § 2072(b).
261.

Burbank, supra note 97, at 1113. Note that Professor Burbank made this point in the

context of formal, as opposed to inherent power, rulemaking.
262. The current federal forum non conveniens formula is invoked in every transnational
case; it makes reference to the same list of factors each time; and it is a method to dismiss the
entire case. The analysis that follows, however, does not necessarily depend upon whether

forum non conveniens is classified as a de facto Rule.
263. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 82 prohibits the interpretation of the federal rules "to
extend or limit" jurisdiction or venue. FED. R. CIv. P. 82. For a detailed consideration of Rule
82's restriction, see Whitten, supra note 169, at 73-86.
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delegated to it the whole of Congress's constitutional authority to regulate
procedure. The Sibbach test asked "whether a rule really regulates
procedure, "' 64 which was in turn interpreted to "include[] a power to
regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between
either."26 5
substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as
The "'rationally capable of classification as either"' test is, of course, the
same one the Court uses to judge the constitutionality of congressional
enactments in the procedure area.266 In 1988, Congress disabused the Court
of the notion that the Enabling Act delegation had been quite so extensive.
Noting that "the Supreme Court had overstepped the bounds" of its
delegated authority on several occasions,16 the House Committee Report
explained that the Act delegates "only a portion" of Congress's power over
procedure and that "[p]roposed section 2072 contains limitations on the
rulemaking power, careful observance of which is essential in the
,,268 Post-1988 decisions suggest that the Court has taken the
future ....
congressional message to heart, rejecting expansive interpretations of Rules
23.1269 and 41(b), 27 among others, 27 1 in light of the limiting language in §
2072(b).
Although the Court appears "more willing to take the substantive rights
limitation.., more seriously, "272 the opinions have provided little guidance

for determining when a Rule offends the substantive rights restriction.
Professor Kelleher suggests that this boundary may be located by evaluating
the following factors: (1) the extent to which Congress has regulated the
area; (2) impact of the rule on congressional policy; (3) whether the matter
is one traditionally in the domain of the States; (4) the trans-substantive
nature of the rule; (5) the implication of policies extrinsic to the business of
the courts; and (6) the importance of the matter to the orderly functioning
273
of the courts. Viewing the federal forum non conveniens doctrine through

264. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
265. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
266. See, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32 (1988) (quoting Hanna, 380
U.S. at 472).
267. H.R. REP. No. 99-422, at 12 (1985).
268. Id. at 20-21.
269. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90, 95-97 (1991) (interpreting Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23.1 narrowly to avoid conflict with requirements of 28 U.S.C. §
2072 (b) (2000)).
270. Semtek Int'l, Inc., v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501-05 (2001) (rejecting
the traditional interpretation of Rule 41(b) as a possible transgression of 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)).
271. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 612-13 (1997) (prescribing
limits to Rule 23 interpretation as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)); see also Bus. Guides, Inc. v.
Chromatic Commc'ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 565-69 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(rejecting an expansive interpretation of Rule 11 as violative of the spirit of § 2072(b)).
272. Kelleher, supra note 125, at 108.
273. Id. at 109-21.
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274

the lens of the Kelleher factors
leads to the conclusion that the Court may
well have stepped over the substance/procedure line.275
Extent of congressional regulation. "Detailed, long-standing congressional
enactments in an area are a strong indication that Congress believes that the
matter requires consideration of policies beyond the business of the
courts.
. . ."276 Kelleher uses venue to illustrate this point, concluding that
"[v]enue ... is a good example of an area in which Congress has 'occupied
277
the field' completely."
How very interesting that the majority in American Dredging
*.,,278
characterized forum non conveniens as a "supervening venue provision.

274. The following discussion omits Kelleher's second and fifth factors. These issues are
discussed in depth elsewhere in this Article. See supra Parts III.A-B (discussing congressional
policies implicated by venue and jurisdiction to prescribe).
275. The Kelleher factors are used here rather than any categorical formulation because a
multi-factor test provides a good tool by which to organize the arguments. Professor Kelleher's
factor list is consistent with many of the definitions offered of § 2072(b)'s substance/procedure
dichotomy. Professor Burbank, for example, suggests that § 2072(b) requires that Congress
make "any prospective federal" law, "where the choice among legal prescriptions would have a
predictable and identifiable effect on such rights." Burbank, supra note 97, at 1114. Professor
Carrington sets forth a functional test, embracing a "Cookian Interpretation of the Rulemaking
Power." Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure"in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J.

281, 299-301. He suggests that several characteristics such as "substantive and political
neutrality," "generalism," and "flexibility, forgiveness, integrality, and judicial professionalism"
define rules of procedure under the REA. Id. at 301-07. He then argues that a procedural rule
so defined "does not affect a substantive right, within the meaning of the second sentence of
the Act, if its application is sufficiently broad to evoke no organized political attention of a
group of litigants or prospective litigants who (reasonably) claim to be specially and adversely
affected by the rule." Id. at 308. Professor Landers similarly suggests that "matters which are the
subject of widespread public controversy, as differentiated from controversy solely among
lawyers," may be categorized as substantive for purposes of the REA. Jonathan M. Landers, Of
Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-ProcedureDilemma,
47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 857 (1974).
276.
277.

Kelleher, supra note 125, at 109.
Id. As Professor Ralph Whitten explains:
[V]enue provides a good example of a topic that, because of these factors, should
not be altered by rule in the absence of weighty countervailing considerations.
Venue rules are a step removed from fundamental rules of court creation and
general subject matter definition, which fall within the exclusive regulatory
province of Congress. As previously observed, venue rules might be omitted from a
federal procedural code altogether. Such rules, however, clearly fall closer to the
exclusive area of congressional concern than do, for example, pleading rules.
Furthermore, the location of civil actions has significant implications for the
burdens that will be endured by different classes of litigants. The impact on those
litigants of an alteration of the statutory venue scheme thus weighs against the
validity of judicial rulemaking within the area except under the most compelling
circumstances.

Whitten, supra note 169, at 64 (citations omitted).
278. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994) ("At bottom, the doctrine of
forum non conveniens is nothing more or less than a supervening venue provision, permitting
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Not one Federal Rule of Civil Procedure regulates venue.279 The
congressional venue scheme on the other hand is vast, encompassing the
general venue provisions, 280 a myriad of special provisions, 28 ' as well as the
21
transfer options in § 1404 282 and § 1406. zs
3 Given the comprehensiveness of
the congressional venue regime, it seems unlikely that the judiciary retains
the inherent power to create a "supervening venue provision" for the
routine transnational case. More likely, the Court is unselfconsciously
encroaching on an area well within the congressional domain.
Whether the matter is traditionally in the domain of the States. Viewing forum

non conveniens exclusively as a court-access doctrine, one can argue that it
is an issue of federal concern. The Federal Courts of Appeals have uniformly
rejected arguments that the Eriedoctrine requires the use of state forum non
conveniens rules in diversity cases. 284 The question is open to debate,
however. Commentators continue to argue that depending upon the
specific state interest at issue, the Rules of Decision Act requires the federal
court system to honor some subset of state court-access decisions. 285
If one focuses on the underlying reason for regulating access, rather
than the forum non conveniens mechanism itself, the analysis shifts.
Especially in cases where state law provides the rule of decision, federal
forum non conveniens undermines the state decision to regulate substantive
conduct. Thus, in diversity actions involving the application of state tort,
property, or contract law to global events, the underlying policy choices
belong to the states.
Is the federal forum non conveniens rule "trans-substantive"?Many scholars

have argued that Congress intended for the "general rules" authorized by
286
the Rules Enabling Act to be neutral as much as possible. Rules that fail

displacement of the ordinary rules of venue when, in light of certain conditions, the trial court
thinks that jurisdiction ought to be declined.").
279.
Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 82 (stating that the Rules of Civil Procedure "shall not be construed
to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts or the venue of actions
therein").
280. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2000).
281. See supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text.
282. 28 U.S.C. § 1404.
283. Id. § 1406.
284. See infta note 351 and accompanying text.
285. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 82, at 1937-38, 1949 (finding that the RDA requires the
federal courts to use state forum non conveniens rules in cases where use of the federal rule
"unduly interfere [s] with the regulatory prerogatives of the states"); Laurel E. Miller, Comment,
Forum Non Conveniens and State Control of Foreign PlaintiffAccess to U.S. Courts in InternationalTort
Actions, 58 U. Ci. L. REv. 1369, 1387-89, 1392 (1991) ("[F]ederal diversity courts should, under
Erie, apply state forum non conveniens rules.").
286. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 275, at 303; Kelleher, supra note 125, at 116; Richard
Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospectsfor ProceduralProgress, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 761, 762,
822-23 (1993); Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Lessons from
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the "trans-substantive" test are not presumptively invalid, 28 7 but as Kelleher
explains "[r]ules that apply only to specific kinds of actions, such as Rule
23.1, which concerns only derivative suits, are suspect, as they provide
greater procedural protections to one class of litigants to the exclusion, and
Forum non conveniens dismissals are available
at the expense, of others.
only in cases where the alternative forum is foreign. The rule is thus
"suspect" because it singles out transnational disputes for disparate
treatment.
As Piper acknowledged, the forum non conveniens doctrine is designed
to regulate forum shopping by foreign plaintiffs in international actions. In
Piper, Justice Marshall openly questioned the motives of such plaintiffs,
certain that the lure of the American jury system provided the chief
explanation for the forum choice. 289 Perhaps the regulation of forum
shopping in transnational cases could be characterized as "trans-substantive"
had the federal courts done anything to stem forum shopping by plaintiffs in
actions based upon domestic events or by defendants in transnational cases.
But as many critics have noted, the federal courts have actively aided and
abetted these shopping sprees. 290 Piper itself is a fine example of the warm
welcome forum shopping defendants receive from the federal courts. 29 ' And
the slippery slope that begun with Van Dusen v. BarrackW and Sun Oil Co. v.

Uniformity and Divergence, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2005-06 (1989). But seeJudith Resnik, The
Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2219, 2220 (1989).
287. For example, consider the heightened pleading requirements in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 9, or the disparate treatment of class actions certified under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 23(b) (2) and 23(b)(3).
288. Kelleher, supra note 125, at 116-17.
289. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 n.18 (1981).
290. See generally Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting
a Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79 (1999); George D. Brown, The Ideologies of Forum Shopping-Why
Doesn't a Conservative Court Protect Defendants?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 649 (1993) (arguing that although
federal courts ostensibly condemn forum shopping in theory, they encourage it in reality);
Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shoppingfor Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice
in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967 (1999); Kimberly Jade Norwood,
Shoppingfor a Venue: The Need for More Limits on Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267 (1996); Louise
Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L.J. 53 (1991); Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1677 (1990). For a wonderfully entertaining version of the forum shopping
opportunities available after the 1988 and 1990 amendments to the general venue statutes, see
Oakley, supranote 138, at 781-82 n.166.
291. Recall that in Piper, the plaintiff filed a wrongful death action stemming from a
Scottish air crash in state court in California. Piper, 454 U.S. at 239-40. After removing to
federal court, the defendants obtained transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 to a district court in
Piper's home state of Pennsylvania. It was at this point that the defendants moved to dismiss the
case on forum non conveniens grounds. Id. at 241. In upholding the district court's dismissal,
the Supreme Court explained that reverse forum shopping by the defendant "ordinarily should
not enter into a trial court's analysis of the private interests." Id. at 252 n.19.
292. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
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Wortman,5 3 which 94produced the Ferens v. John Deere Co. decision, leaves one
nearly breathless.1
Forum shopping is rampant in the federal courts. Can treating forum
shopping differently in global disputes be justified? Proponents of a "robust"
federal forum non conveniens approach call attention to the "congested
dockets" of our already "overburdened" federal courts. 29 5 We can all agree
that the federal courts are congested, but it is doubtful that such an
observation justifies the use of the inherent power to deny federal court
access to a certain class of plaintiffs. Many a case is more burdensome than
the routine international dispute---class actions, multi-party securities
disputes, and federal antitrust claims jump to mind. 96 The Supreme Court
has taken a hard line on district court efforts to regulate workloads through
remand in the removal context. The Court bucked a congressional statute
prohibiting appellate review of remand decisions in order to impress upon
the trial courts the idea that they lacked power to decline jurisdiction over
properly removed actions. 297 And the courts of appeals have subjected
dismissals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) to serious scrutiny in an effort to
repress docket clearing behavior. 298

293. 486 U.S. 717, 728-34 (1988) (allowing Kansas to use its own statute of limitations in a
nationwide class action).
294. See generally Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990). Ferens involved a
Pennsylvania resident injured in Pennsylvania. The Ferenses filed suit in Mississippi, however,
because their claim was time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations in Pennsylvania. Id. at
519. The plaintiffs then moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer the action to
Pennsylvania. Id. at 520. The district court granted the motion. Id. On review, the Supreme
Court upheld the transfer, explaining that "Congress gave the Ferenses the power to seek a
transfer in § 1404(a) ...[and we] see no alternative rule that would produce a more acceptable
result." Id. at 531. For a thorough consideration of Ferens, see generally KimberlyJade Norwood,
Double Forum Shopping and the Extension of Ferens to Federal Claims that Borrow State Limitations
Periods, 44 EMoRY L.J. 501 (1995).

295. See Douglas W. Dunham & Eric F. Gladbach, Forum Non Conveniens and ForeignPlaintiffs
in the 1990s, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 665, 689-90 n.162 (1999) (collecting cases that rely on an
overburdened court system for forum non conveniens dismissals). Compare David E. Steinberg,
The Motion to Transfer and the Interests of Justice, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 443, 500-604 (1990)
(considering the ramifications of docket congestion in motions to transfer), with Michael M.
Karayanni, The Myth and Reality of a Controversy: "PublicFactors" and the Forum Non Conveniens
Doctrine, 21 WIS. INT'L L.J. 327, 341-43 (2003) (arguing that congested dockets are an
insufficient justification for forum non conveniens dismissals).
296. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 may suggest that Congress does not view the
federal courts as overburdened or believe that docket congestion is a significant problem. The
Act allows original jurisdiction and removal in a much broader range of class actions than could
previously be litigated in the federal courts. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 1092, 119 Stat. 4 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 2005)).
297. See Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 345-52 (1976)
(interpreting the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which makes remand orders non-reviewable,
not to preclude review of district court remand, which was based upon docket congestion).
298. See, e.g., Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 140 F.3d 442, 445-48
(2d Cir. 1998) (reversing the district court's refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, which
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Only in abstention scenarios does the Court allow a district judge to
decline to entertain an otherwise properly filed action. Abstention itself is
the subject of heated debate.299 Most forms of abstention differ from forum
non conveniens in that the lower federal courts may not abstain absent an
ongoing action in a state court system.3 0 0 The classic abstention doctrines
claim to be premised upon the Court's constitutional authority to maintain
the proper federal-state balance of power. 30 1 The forum non conveniens

was based in part on the district court's concern about its "judicial resources"); Executive
Software N. Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 24 F.3d 1545, 1560 n.15 (9th
Cir. 1994) (holding that use of § 1367 solely to ease docket congestion was "clearly ...
impermissible").
299. Compare Linda S. Mullenix, A Branch Too Far: Pruningthe Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEO.
L.J. 99, 152-53 (1986), and Redish, supra note 126, at 84 ("Judge-made abstention, then,
constitutes judicial lawmaking of the most sweeping nature."), with David L. Shapiro, jurisdiction
and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 545 (1985) ("[T]he continued exercise of discretion ...
has much to contribute to the easing of interbranch and intergovernmental tensions in our
complex system of government."), and James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to
Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1095-1100 (1994) (opining that judicial

abstention may serve a narrowly tailored purpose).
300.
But see R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (allowing
abstention even in the absence of an ongoing state action). The Court curtailed the reach of
Pullman abstention in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75-76 (1997), holding
that certification to a state's highest court now occupies much of the territory once covered by
Pullman abstention.
301. For a detailed discussion of the abstention doctrines, see ERW1N CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 685-778 (2d ed. 2003). Three of the abstention doctrines deal with
abstention in cases where state law is unclear: (1) Pullman abstention, first recognized in
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941), requires a district court to abstain
"because a state court's clarification of state law might avoid a federal court ruling on
constitutional grounds"; (2) Thibodaux abstention, see Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959), authorizes "[a]bstention in diversity cases because of unclear
state law"; and (3) Burford abstention, based on Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943),
allows abstention in cases involving "complex state administrative procedures." CHEMERINSKY,
supra, § 12.1, at 685-86. A fourth type, called Younger abstention after Younger v. Htarris,401 U.S.
37 (1971), prohibits federal courts from "enjoin[ing] pending state court criminal
proceedings." CHEMERINSKY, supr, § 13.1, at 715.
Colorado River abstention, recognized in Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), allows the district court to abstain in "truly exceptional
circumstances... out of deference to pending state court proceedings." CHEMERINSKY, supra, §
14.2, at 764. Professor Mullenix explains that although Colorado River abstention claims
federalism pedigree, it is actually premised on concerns for congested federal dockets. See
Mullenix, supra note 299, at 108.
Though not generally referred to as "abstention," the judicially created exceptions to
diversity jurisdiction for domestic relations and probate provide an apt analogy to the forum
non conveniens scheme. For years, the Supreme Court has interpreted the statutory grant of
diversity jurisdiction as excluding these topics. See generally Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712 (7th
Cir. 1982); Peter Nicolas, Fighting the ProbateMafia: A Dissection of the Probate Exception to Federal
CourtJurisdiction,74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1479 (2001). As Professor Redish notes, the courts have now
given up even the pretext of relying on the statute. Redish, supra note 126, at 102-04. Judge
Posner rationalizes continued adherence to the exceptions by the longevity of the practice,
suggesting this may be one area in which congressional silence can legitimately be taken as
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doctrine may be similarly characterized as an effort to regulate the proper
balance of power among nations, as opposed to the states. But accepting
such a rationale plunges the Court into something substantive indeed-the
regulation of foreign affairs. If the Constitution's foreign relations power
provides the basis for the federal forum non conveniens doctrine, the Court
is well out of the housekeeping department and deep into the federal
common law of international diplomacy.' °2
Lastly, although federal forum non conveniens decisions make little
overt reference to tort theory, the notion that there is something improper
about seeking compensation in the United States for an injury incurred
303
Under the guise of regulating
abroad is implicit in many an opinion.
international forum shopping, the federal courts immunize American
corporate defendants from regulation at home and liability for acts
abroad.304 The academic literature is replete with debate about forum non
acquiescence. Dragon, 679 F.2d at 713 ("[H]owever shoddy the historical underpinnings of the
probate exception, it is too well established a feature of our federal system to be lightly
discarded, and by an inferior court at that .. ").
If the basis for the diversity exceptions is truly "pedigree," then forum non conveniens
has nothing in common with these forms of abstention. Unlike the probate and domestic
relations exceptions, federal forum non conveniens has never enjoyed even the pretext of
statutory authorization. Nor does it have a long history within the federal court system. Quite
the opposite. The enactment in 1948 of 28 U.S.C. § 1404, which directly addressed the factual
situation in Gulf Oil, preempted continued use of the doctrine in the domestic context. Thus,
the doctrine in its current form was not announced "officially" until 1981 by Piper.Moreover, as
Allan Stein reports, the historical pedigree of the forum non conveniens is suspect. Professor
Stein provides a fascinating account of the doctrine's rise in popularity, see Stein, supra note 16,
at 795-812, noting that the doctrine was "virtually unheard of, outside of the admiralty context
[in the American courts] prior to 1929." Id. at 801. And although Justice Scalia in American
Dredging insists that forum non conveniens is an ancient Scottish remedy, Am. Dredging Co. v.
Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 (1994), this questionable historical statement adds nothing to the
inherent power debate. The question is whether the federal courts have been using the
doctrine so long that Congress can be taken to agree on its desirability. Whether the Scots
embraced it in 1866 (which, as Stein points out is "well after" the creation of the American
courts) is irrelevant.
Professor Redish contends that diversity abstention runs afoul of separation of powers
principles. Redish, supra note 126, at 104. Given the comprehensiveness of the congressional
subject matter jurisdiction scheme and the general agreement that subject matter jurisdiction is
beyond the inherent lawmaking power of the courts, see Lawrence Gene Sager, Constitutional
Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 95 HARv. L. REv.
17, 22 (1981), diversity abstention, like forum non conveniens, looks like a straightforward
abuse of the inherent power.
302. The Supreme Court has relied on the foreign relations powers to create federal
common law governing certain types of international disputes. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 461-62 (1964) (creating the act of state doctrine). Federal
common law is preemptive on the States.
303. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Chrysler Corp., 301 F.3d 377, 381-82 (5th Cir. 2002); In re Union
Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. 842, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Harrison v. Wyeth Labs., 510 F. Supp. 1, 4
(E.D. Pa. 1980).
304. Malcolm J. Rogge, Towards TransnationalCorporateAccountability in the Global Economy:
Challengingthe Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in In Re: Union Carbide, Alfaro, Sequihua, and
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conveniens and global loss allocation.3 °5 Scholars have suggested, for
example, that allowing foreign suits in the United States inhibits the
development of "third world" legal systems. °6 Such arguments may be
correct and the Court's situs rule may, as an economic matter, be the best
approach. But regardless of how well constructed the Court's position may
be, a doctrine premised upon tort theory can hardly be characterized as
"trans-substantive."
The importance of the matter to the orderlyfunctioning of the courts. Here the
procedural/housekeeping arguments come to life. In theory, forum non
07
conveniens allows the courts to avoid difficult applications of foreign law,
alleviate docket congestion and delay, 08 protect the jury from cases in which
there is no "local interest, "009 and prevent the potential unfairness of
requiring a resident defendant to defend himself in a forum where
international witnesses and evidence are beyond his reach:.0
In practice, forum non conveniens dismissals do not immunize the
federal judiciary from difficult determinations of foreign law. The federal
courts routinely conduct a choice of law analysis and an inquiry into the
content of foreign law as part of the forum non conveniens analysis.31 More
importantly, in an age of globalization, the federal courts cannot reasonably
expect to avoid cases that rely on foreign law. International disputes are

Aguinda, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 299, 300 (2001) ("In the context of transnational litigation the
function of forum non conveniens is often analogous to the function of the corporate veil of
separate legal personality-both doctrines are used to insulate the parent company from
liability for activities carried out abroad."); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Justice Restored: Using a
Preservation-of-Court-AccessApproach to Replace Forum Non Conveniens in Five InternationalProductInjury Case Studies, 24 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 53, 54 (2003) (describing forum non conveniens as
an "impenetrable barrier" to foreign plaintiffs).
305. Rogge, supra note 304, at 300-01 (arguing that the intent and direct effect of forum
non conveniens in federal courts is to insulate multinational corporations and shift the cost to
other, less developed countries); Van Detta, supra note 22, at 430 (noting that forum non
conveniens allocates responsibility for tortuous activity away from developed countries).
306. See, e.g., Peter J. Carney, Comment, International Forum Non Conveniens: "Section
1404.5 "-A Proposal in the Interest of Sovereignty, Comity, and IndividualJustice, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
415, 421-22 (1995).
307. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 260 (1981) (allowing the lack of a court's
familiarity with the law of anotherjurisdiction to factor into a motion for forum non conveniens
dismissal).
308. Id. at 260 n.6.
309. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947) ("Jury duty is a burden that
ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the
litigation.").
310. Id.
311. As Professor Davies explains, in order to assess both availability and adequacy of the
foreign forum, the district court must often analyze the jurisdictional and substantive law of the
foreign forum. See Davies, supra note 2, at 319-23, 358.
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litigated in increasing numbers in the federal courts each year;312 federal
judges either are, or are becoming, skilled in the foreign law application
game.
The docket congestion concerns seem overblown. As noted previously,
many cases in the federal courts are more time-consuming than the standard
transnational dispute. And the time devoted to forum non conveniens
motions is itself quite significant.
The jury point is dated. If a federal district court has jurisdiction and
venue over a case, it is hard to imagine that there is no connection between
the forum inhabitants and the litigation. Members of the jury pool either
reside in the same district with the defendant or the dispute involves events
or omissions by defendant in the jury community. 13 The jury therefore has
the same community interests in determining a dispute against the
defendant as it would in any other case. Consider the Ford Explorer rollover
cases raising design defect claims. It seems lamentably parochial to suggest
that a Michigan jury would have a greater interest in regulating Ford's
behavior toward a California plaintiff than it would toward a plaintiff from
nearby Windsor, Canada. And where the forum state's law or United States
statutory law applies to the dispute, the state or Congress has already
determined that its citizens have an "interest" in the case.314
Lastly, as Martin Davies explains so well, most of the evidentiary
concerns extant in Gulf Oil are obsolete. 5 Even when the Court released
Piper in 1981, facsimile machines were rare and produced difficult-to-read
documents, the potential for video recording was only beginning to emerge,
and international telephone service was spotty and expensive. More than
twenty years later, the world has entered a new age, defined by its
technological advances. Amended in 1980 and again in 1993, Rule 30 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the taking of depositions by
"remote electronic means." 1 6 Today, depositions are routinely videotaped.
As Professor Davies observes, "[v]ideotaped depositions allow the court to
make an assessment of the witness's demeanor under cross examination, so
they may be an acceptable substitute for the presence of almost any witness,
even key witnesses. " "' Similarly, the amendment of Rule 43(a) in 1996 now
makes "it possible for the testimony of distant witnesses, including those in

312.

Gary B. Born, Reflections on JudicialJurisdiction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT'L &

COMP. L. 1, 5 (1987) ("The post-War era's expansion of international trade fueled a dramatic
increase in legal disputes between United States citizens and foreign persons.").

313. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(1), (b)(2) (2000) (limiting venue to the
defendant's state of residence or a district "in which a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred").
314.
315.

316.
317.

See supra Part III. B.
See Davies, supranote 2, at 325-51.
FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b) (7).

Davies, supra note 2, at 329.
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foreign countries, to be taken in open court. " "8 The Hague Evidence
Convention, 3 19 while not providing a trouble-free process, allows parties
to
•
320
compel evidence from unwilling foreign witnesses in signatory countries.
Documentary evidence is discoverable from a party to the litigation, even a
foreign one, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34 as well as pursuant to
the Hague Evidence Convention. Transmission of documentary evidence is
seldom an issue in the digital age. And in many a case, the video camera
obviates the need to "view the premises" (or wreckage). All this is not to say
that evidentiary concerns no longer arise in international litigation-of
course they do.32 ' But those concerns are no longer so dramatic as to justify
the use of the inherent power to bar foreign plaintiffs from the federal
courts.
In sum, analysis under the Kelleher factors suggests that the forum non
conveniens doctrine lies in territory that Congress has claimed for itself.
Although the Rules Enabling Act applies by its terms to formal rulemaking,
it is relevant to inherent power lawmaking. As Congress becomes
increasingly active in the procedural realm, the inherent power space
available for judicial regulation diminishes. The REA substance/procedure
test provides a reliable indication of congressional permission to regulate.
Determining the exact location of that line is difficult, but in the forum non
conveniens context it appears that Congress has denied the Court such
permission.

318. Id. at 326; see FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a). Professor Davies notes that several forum non
conveniens decisions have taken into account the availability of video technology. Davies, supra
note 2, at 330 & n.83 (citing cases).
319.

Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar.

18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231.
320. Id. at art. 10; see Sharon Devine & Christine M. Olsen, Note, Taking Evidence Outside of
the United States, 55 B.U. L. REV. 368, 381-85 (1975) (detailing the ability of litigants to access
foreign testimony and discovery).

321. One wonders, however, how real some of the evidentiary concerns of defendants in
international forum non conveniens cases are. Ford argued that the inability to implead
potentially liable third parties in the foreign Explorer rollover cases was so serious as to require
a forum non conveniens dismissal in all of the Colombian and Venezuelan actions. See In re
Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1145, 1152, 1153
(S.D. Ind. 2002). The court did not inquire into Ford's domestic impleader habits, but it would
have been interesting to know whether Ford had impleaded the individual drivers of other cars
involved in the U.S. rollover accidents and whether the inability to implead domestically had
been urged by Ford as a reason for transfer of such cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1404.
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The Rules of Decision Act

Like the Rules Enabling Act, the Rules of Decision Act 2 2 is relevant to
the proper scope of the Court's inherent authority vis-4-vis Congress. The
Rules of Decision Act represents the congressional vision of the appropriate
balance between state law and inherent power lawmaking by the federal
courts.3 23 Note

that the Rules of Decision Act is broader than

the

constitutional limits set by structural federalism, otherwise there would be
no need for the legislation. 124 Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York was not
constitutionally mandated, but was thought by the Court to be necessary for
the full enforcement of the Act. Thus, if the Court violates the lines drawn
by

the Rules of Decision Act,125 it does not necessarily violate the
326

constitutional principles at issue in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.
A
common law rule, which might otherwise be within the judiciary's
constitutional power to create, may nonetheless exceed congressional limits
on inherent authority innovation set forth by the Rules of Decision Act.
The Supreme Court has never directly confronted the relationship
between forum non conveniens and the Rules of Decision Act. Piper
specifically reserved the "Erie question. 0,,27 American Dredging, decided in
1994, considered only whether forum non conveniens was preemptive in
admiralty actions in state court.: 2" The Court concluded that forum non
conveniens was not "'peculiar to the special problems of admiralty, -,329 and
that the States were therefore free to apply their own versions of the
doctrine. 3 °

322. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000) ("The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution
or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where
they apply.").
323. See Martin H. Redish, FederalCommon Law, PoliticalLegitimacy, and the Interpretive Process:
An "Institutionalist"Perspective,
83 Nw. U. L. REv. 761, 766 (1989). Professor Redish explains that
the Rules of Decision "Act's fundamental purposes are to reduce the pervasive reach of federal
substantive law or, at the very least, to limit the situations in which federal substantive law
displaces state law to those specific instances in which Congress--rather than the federal
judiciary-chooses to do so." Id.
324. Id. (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 513).
325. See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-12 (1945).
326. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
327. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n.13 (1981) ("In previous forum non
conveniens decisions, the Court has left unresolved the question whether under Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins ... state or federal law of forum non conveniens applies in a diversity case .... [H]ere
also, we need not resolve the Erie question." (citations omitted)).
328. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 450 (1994).
329. Id. (quoting GulfOil Corp., 330 U.S. at 513).
330. Id. at 457. It should be noted that in the course of describing the forum non
conveniens doctrine as a "supervening venue provision," Justice Scalia commented that "venue
is a matter that goes to process rather than substantive rights." Id. at 453.
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The Erie doctrine has received extensive attention in the academic
literature, and the following discussion assumes a level of familiarity with
relevant cases and theory. Most scholars divide Erie problems into three
types, or tracks:33' (1) conflicts between federal statutes and state law; (2)
conflicts between rules promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act and state
law; and (3) conflicts between federal judge-made law and state law. The
federal forum non conveniens doctrine is a creature ofjudicial design. Statefederal conflicts in this realm, therefore, fall into the third category.
Since Erie, the Court has only twice considered conflicts between federal
judge-made doctrines and state law. Byrd v. Blue Ridge,33 2 decided in 1958,
involved a choice between the federal allocation of judge and jury duties
and a South Carolina practice requiring the judge to determine a specific
factual question.3 3 Although both the state and federal methods were surely
procedural in the classic sense of the word, failure to embrace the state
practice was outcome determinative as defined by Guaranty Trust-a plaintiff
would likely prefer to litigate in the federal forum rather than the state.334
Justice Brennan introduced a type of interest analysis, balancing the federal
interest in jury decision making and the South Carolina reasons for
preferring a judge in the specific situation.3 5 The federal interest
prevailed. 3 6
In 1996, the Supreme Court returned to the judge-made law problem in
Gasperiniv. Center for Humanities, Inc.337 At issue in Gasperiniwas the choice
between the federal standard for granting new trials on the basis of
excessiveness and a New York statute that altered that standard for state
verdicts. 3 8 The federal standard was judicially created. Federal judges
applied the classic "'shock[s] the conscience'" test.3 3 9 In contrast, the New

York legislation directed the New York Appellate Division to compare jury
verdicts among similarly situated plaintiffs and remand for new trial those
cases in which the size of the verdict "'deviate[d] materially"' from the
norm. 340 In the course of applying the statute, the New York appellate courts

331. For further explanation of the three-track paradigm as first enunciated, see John Hart
Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REv. 693, 698 (1974), explaining that "the Erie
problem" is in fact "three distinct and rather ordinary problems of statutory and constitutional
interpretation."
332. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
333. Id. at 533-34.
334. Id. at 536-38.
335. Id. at 537-38.
336. Id. at 538.
337. 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
338. Id. at 418-19.
339. Id. at 422 (quoting Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 72 F.3d 1003, 1012-13
(2d Cir. 1995)).
340. Id. at 418 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5501(c) (McKinney 1995)).
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charged the trial courts to use the same standard in deciding initially
whether a verdict was sufficiently excessive to warrant a new trial.3 4'
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg followed Byrd as if it had
never been called into question. 342 She examined the regulatory goals of the
New York legislation343 and concluded that the scheme was both substantive
and procedural in nature.344 She then inquired whether failure to use the
state approach was outcome determinative.3 45 Asking if "'application of the
[standard would] . . .have so important an effect upon the fortunes of one

or both of the litigants that failure to [apply] it would [unfairly discriminate
against citizens of the forum State, or] be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose
federal court?,'3 46 she answered in the affirmative.347 The opinion then
moved on to balance the competing federal and state interests at issue. 348
The result was not the wholesale importation of the New York approach into
federal court. The Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment
counseled against adopting the intense appellate scrutiny of jury verdicts
envisioned by the New York legislation. 49 Justice Ginsburg, therefore,
crafted a version of the New York scheme for use in the federal courts that
was consistent with the federal interest in limiting appellate review of jury
factfinding: district court judges were instructed to apply the "deviates
materially" standard to excessiveness claims, while appellate review was
limited to "abuse of discretion.

341. Id. at 425.
342. Dicta in Hannav. Plumer, decided a mere seven years after Byrd, left the applicability of
the balancing approach in Byrd somewhat in question. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471
(1965); Allan Ides, The Supreme Court and the Law to Be Applied in Diversity Cases: A Critical Guide to
the Development and Application of the Erie Doctrine and Related Problems, 163 F.R.D. 19, 86 (1995)
(debating whether Byrd survived Hanna); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work: Does
Anyone Else Think the Supreme Court Is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?,
73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 963, 986 (1998) (noting that after Hanna, "Byrd [was left] in a puzzling
limbo").
343. Justice Ginsburg cited findings of the New York legislature supporting the "deviates
materially" standard. She noted that the lawmakers found the "shock the conscience" test to be
an inadequate check and preferred a system in which there would be closer appellate scrutiny
of damage awards. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 423. The Supreme Court explained that New York
lawmakers also thought that the "deviates materially" standard would promote greater stability
in the tort system and would ensure greater fairness for similarly situated defendants. Id. at
424-25.
344. Id. at 429.
345. Id.at 428.
346. Id. (quoting Hanna,380 U.S. at 468 n.9).
347. Id. at 430.
348.
Gasperini,518 U.S. at 431-32.
349. See id. at 432-33.
350. Id. at 438.
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The Erie Question in the Federal Courts of Appeals

The courts of appeals have uniformly rejected Rules of Decision Act
challenges to the use of federal forum non conveniens in diversity actions. ,351
Only the Eleventh Circuit has addressed the question in the post-Gasperini
environment, but the balancing test it used did not differ significantly from
the pre-Gasperini approach under Byrd.352 Generally, the circuit court
decisions acknowledge that failure to use state forum non conveniens law in
diversity cases is outcome-determinative in that the difference between the
state and federal approaches causes significant forum shopping,5 5 especially
by defendants through removal. The opinions then turn to the balancing
problem. The federal interests identified by the courts of appeals may be
divided into roughly three types: (1) the federal interest in housekeeping,
which arguably includes issues such as docket congestion, and insuring
proper access to credible witnesses, evidence, and the like; 35 4 (2) the federal

interest in maintaining a unitary court system;3 55 and (3) the federal interest
in foreign relations. 356
Conspicuously absent from the circuit court opinions is any real
discussion of the state interests at issue. Neither Byrd nor Gasperini
countenances such an omission. The courts of appeals apparently assume
that states invoke forum non conveniens for the same docket clearing
benefits that the federal courts seek. This seems overly simplistic; as Allan
Stein has357explained, state court-access doctrines are supported by a variety of
reasons. Consider that before the Texas legislature intervened, at least one
351.
See, e.g.,
Monegro v. Rosa, 211 F.3d 509, 511-12 (9th Cir. 2000); Rivendell Forest
Prods., Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 2 F.3d 990, 992 (10th Cir. 1993); Royal Bed & Spring Co.,
Inc. v. Famossul Industria e Comercio de Moveis Ltda., 906 F.2d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 1990); In reAir
Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La., 821 F.2d 1147, 1159 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), vacated on
other grounds sub nom. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Lopez, 490 U.S. 1032 (1989); Sibaja v. Dow
Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1219 (11th Cir. 1985); Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 316 (6th Cir.
1974).
352. SeeEsfeld v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 289 F.3d 1300, 1306-08 (11th Cir. 2002).
353. See, e.g.,
id. at 1308-12; Royal Bed & Spring Co., 906 F.2d at 50-53; In re Air Crash
Disaster,821 F.2d at 1157-58.
354. See, e.g.,
Royal Bed & Spring Co., 906 F.2d at 50 (finding great federal interest in the
management of the procedure); In re Air Crash Disaster, 821 F.2d at 1159 (finding a federal
interest in "self-management"); Sibaja, 757 F.2d at 1218 ("The Court's interest in controlling its
crowded docket ... provides a basis for the Court's inherent power to dismiss on grounds of
forum non conveniens ....
").
355. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster, 821 F.2d at 1158 (justifying federal employment of
forum non conveniens in part to protect the "internal consistency and administration" of the
federal system); Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527, 528 (4th Cir. 1970).
356. See, e.g., Esfeld, 289 F.3d at 1312 (finding that the federal government has a "unique
interest" in the area of foreign relations as affected by forum non conveniens); Rivendell Forest
Prods. Ltd., 2 F.3d at 992 (recognizing that foreign policy concerns "militate" in favor of federal
forum non conveniens).
357. See Stein, supra note 82, at 1937-38 (noting the importance of court-access
justifications and finding "federal respect for restrictive state court-access provisions" to be
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member of the Texas Supreme Court imbued the State's Open Courts
legislation with the intent to regulate corporations doing business in
Texas.' 5' If deterrence was a substantive goal behind the Texas rejection of
forum non conveniens, it seems unlikely that a proper application of the
Byrd or Gasperinibalancing tests could tip the balance in the federal favor.
Nor do the federal countervailing interests identified by the courts of
appeals appear sufficiently weighty to justify wholesale use of federal forum
non conveniens in diversity actions. The "housekeeping" justification is
particularly troubling. If housekeeping can trump a state regulatory
objective, there is no need to balance state and federal interests; every
federal procedure can be characterized as necessary or beneficial to the
smooth operation of the federal courts.35 9
The need for a uniform practice in the unitary federal system is more
intriguing. Like housekeeping, uniformity has some makeweight qualities. If
uniformity alone may overcome state regulatory goals, it is hard to see how
any federal practice can fail.36 0 In the forum non conveniens context,
however, one can imagine that the importation of state forum non
conveniens formulas into federal practice could be disruptive. As the
Eleventh Circuit recently pointed out, transfer within the federal system
would bring up some strange inconsistencies, especially in the Van Dusen
context. 31 The forum non conveniens practice of the transferor court would
follow the case. Thus, a diversity action originally filed in Florida and
transferred to federal court in Minnesota would presumably be subject to
the Florida forum non conveniens analysis, which focuses on the lawsuit's
connection with Florida.162 Similarly, use of state forum non conveniens
would leave federal cases involving supplemental jurisdiction on unstable
ground. Arguably, the federal version of forum non conveniens would apply
to federal questions, while supplemental state claims would live or die on the
basis of the state standard, even though the same witnesses and evidence
would be required for both causes of action.
On the other hand, the claim that a "uniform" federal practice is
important in the forum non conveniens arena lacks credibility. At present,
the federal system operates without anything approaching a uniform forum

erratic). In the context of litigation, examples of such state substantive goals include a state's
desire to "vest certain parties with a convenient venue; to maintain the confidentiality of certain
information; to limit the expense of litigation; to give itsjuries authority to assess the liability of
certain parties;" and to open the state courts to a large volume of litigation. Id. at 1949-50.
358. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 680, 682 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J.,
concurring).
359. See Stein, supranote 82, at 1942-51.
360. Id. at 1970-71.
361.
Esfeld, 289 F.3d at 1312-13.
362. Id. at 1313 (stating that Florida forum non conveniens focuses solely on contacts with
the State of Florida).
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Every circuit has its own version of the Piper

test;3 64 importing applicable state formulas would add only slightly to the

existing chaos. Moreover, forum non conveniens dismissals are committed
to the "sound discretion" of the trial judge.3 65 Had the Supreme Court felt
that uniformity in forum non conveniens was integral to the smooth
functioning of the federal court system, it surely would have chosen a more
effective method to achieve that goal.
The foreign relations point brings us to higher ground. There are
undoubtedly cases in which defendants are closely connected to foreign
government initiatives. 366 Diplomacy is needed in assessing the availability of
a foreign forum. 3 67 Additionally, a forum non conveniens decision may

require balancing of competing sovereign interests regarding a particular
3611
transnational dispute.
On the other hand, as Professor Stein points out,
the foreign relations interest is not implicated in every forum non
conveniens case. 369 The need for the federal system to speak with "one voice"
in private transnational litigation is also open to debate. 70 Moreover, if the
federal foreign relations interest provides sufficient bulk to support the
federal approach, it draws into question the continued legitimacy of state
forum non conveniens practices in transnational litigation. If foreign
relations form the basis for federal forum non conveniens, we appear to be
dealing with a species of substantive federal common law normally binding
in the state courts.
Several commentators have concluded that none of the interests
identified by the courts of appeals is sufficiently weighty to justify the
rejection of state forum non conveniens approaches in diversity actions.37'

363. See supra notes 60-78 and accompanying text.
364. See supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
365. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 511 (1947).
366. See, e.g., Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 484-85 (2003); Verlinden B.V. v.
Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 497 (1983).
367. Iragorri v. United Techs. Corp., 274 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2001) (considering the safety
of litigating in Colombia); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 101 (2d Cir. 2000)
(finding that British courts "are exemplary in their fairness and commitment to the rule of
law"); In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1143-44
(S.D. Ind. 2002) (considering the safety of litigating in Colombia).
368. See, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984,
809 F.2d 195, 201-02 (2d Cir. 1987) (weighing India's interest in litigating the dispute and
finding that its interest in facilitating the trial and adjudication of the victims' claims was greater
than that of the United States); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F.
Supp. 2d 289, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing Sudanese interest in its own adjudication).
369. See Stein, supra note 82, at 2003. In Costa, for example, the foreign relations interest
was surely of no importance. The dispute involved an Italian cruise line and injured American
passengers. Esfeld v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 289 F.3d 1300, 1301-02 (11th Cir. 2002).
370. See Stein, supranote 82, at 2003.
371. Id. at 1946-53; Miller, supra note 285, at 1377-87 (finding stated reasons for use of
federal rather than state standards to be insufficient).
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Of particular note is Allan Stein's reconceptualization of the Erie problem in
the court-access context. Professor Stein, writing prior to Gasperini, rejects
the notion that uniformity between federal and state courts is the
overarching purpose of the Rules of Decision Act.3

2

Instead, he advocates a

type of vertical interest analysis that focuses on whether failure to use a state
rule in federal court actually impinges upon a state regulatory goal. 73 If the
answer to the question is no, then no "conflict" between the federal and
state approaches exists. The federal courts in such situations are free to use
their own procedures regardless of the forum shopping consequences. 74 In
the case of forum non conveniens, Stein demonstrates that states have a
variety of reasons for employing the doctrine, some of which conflict directly
with

the federal

forum non conveniens

goals.3 7 5 It

is only in such

circumstances, where the state interest is impaired by 3 federal
76
nonconformity, that a traditional balancing test should be employed.
In Stein's judgment and in my own, none of the Article III interests
offered by the courts of appeals is of sufficient stature to overcome a state
regulatory goal where state and federal practices conflict.37 7 The
constitutional holding of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins prohibits the judicial
development of substantive legal rules under the guise of Article III; the
Rules of Decision Act takes up where the Constitution leaves off. The Act
represents the congressional judgment that inherent power innovations of
the federal procedural variety should not impinge upon substantive state
regulatory policies. Congress has already balanced the federal courts'
procedural interests in things like housekeeping and uniformity against
potential state interests. Congress sided with the States. The Rules of
Decision Act, therefore, restricts federal procedural common law to rules
that do not conflict with substantive state interests or rules designed to
further federal interests that lie beyond Article 111.378

372. Stein, supra note 82, at 1952.
373. Id. at 1941 ("The appropriate inquiry, I suggest, is not how state law is categorized, but
whether the policies driving the state law are undermined by federal nonconformity.").
374. Id at 1943-44.
375. Id. at 1974-85. Professor Stein lists such state interests as regulating defendants,
generation of revenue, and a dislike of private control over venue.
376. Id.at 1941.
377. Stein, supra note 82, at 2001-02. Professor Stein recognizes one type of Article III
practice that might provide a legitimate affirmative countervailing interest: one
"implement[ing] the purpose of federal jurisdiction." Id.
378. Professor Stein would include federal practices designed to implement or protect the
purposes of federal subject matter jurisdiction on this list. Id. at 2002; cf Redish, supra note 323,
at 766-67 (arguing that even substantive federal common law is prohibited by the Rules of
Decision Act). Professor Redish interprets the Rules of Decision Act to prohibit the creation of
even substantive federal common law based upon non-Article III interests, ld. According to
Redish, "all federal 'common law' . . . constitutes an illegitimate judicial rejection of that
legislative goal." Id.
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The only non-Article III interest advocated by the courts of appeals in
the forum non conveniens debate is the federal interest in foreign relations.
The federal courts have long contended that the federal government has
exclusive jurisdiction over the conduct of international affairs. 79 This makes
the problem peculiarly complex. As mentioned above, if the federal court
system must speak with one voice in private transnational disputes, it is
difficult to imagine that the States should be allowed to speak with a
different "voice" in the international arena. Ironically, analysis of the Rules
of Decision Act appears to point us down the path to federal preemption.
Thankfully, discussion of so difficult a problem lies beyond the scope of this
80
Article.
The Rules of Decision Act appears to require the federal courts to apply
some subset of state forum non conveniens rules in diversity actions. From
an inherent power perspective, however, importing "conflicting" state rules
into federal diversity practice by no means solves the bulk of the inherent
authority defects with the existing forum non conveniens regime. State
approaches may be as inconsistent with congressional goals as the federal
practice is now. But it is here that we find the key to the Erie problem. The
lack of inherent authority support for the federal doctrine, rather than the
differences between federal and state forum non conveniens practices, is the
source of the discord. If the Court restricts federal forum non conveniens
dismissals to the inherent power boundaries drawn by Congress, the Rules of
Decision Act conundrum fades away.
b.

Switching Erie "Tracks"

Congress has served as the gatekeeper for the federal courts since it
created the lower federal courts in 1789. 18 Congress alone controls venue

379. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981) (citing United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936)); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 461-62 (1964) (White, J., dissenting); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-35
(1920). Professor Koh has argued that customary international law is not only federal law, but
also preempts state law where the Erie Doctrine cannot. Harold Hongju Koh, Is InternationalLaw
Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1824, 1830-60 (1998). But see Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L.
Goldsmith, Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position,
110 HARv. L. REV. 815 (1997) (questioning the notion that customary international law is part
of federal law and displaces state law).
380. See Miller, supra note 285, at 1377 (arguing that federal preemption is unwarranted
because the "state's interest in formulating its own forum non conveniens rules outweighs the
comparatively slight federal interest in international tort cases involving private litigants"). Note
that under Professor Redish's interpretation, the Rules of Decision Act prohibits the federal
courts from fashioning a substantive federal common law version of the forum non conveniens
doctrine that would be binding on the States. See Redish, supranote 323, at 766-67.
381. Professor Stein contends that congressional subject-matter statutes and traditional
limits on personal jurisdiction provided the restrictions on federal court access until Congress
passed what Stein terms the "first true venue rule" in 1858. Stein, supra note 16, at 799-800.
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382

and subject matter jurisdiction.
Congress sets the limits on transfer.
3 83
Congress decides when removal from state to federal court is appropriate.
Personal jurisdiction is limited by the Constitution, but because of
Congress's pervasive regulation of service of process, the Court declined to
exercise inherent authority in that area.:1 4 Proper deference to the
congressional gatekeeping role requires that the Court treat forum non
conveniens dismissals as preempted by congressional legislation, s5 and thus
available, if at all, only in the truly rare instances that Congress did not
contemplate. 386 The Rules of Decision Act analysis, therefore, changes.
Recasting federal forum non conveniens as an incident of the federal
statutory scheme moves the Erie analysis to the first "track." It becomes a
conflict between state court-access procedures and federal statutory law. The
few drops of Supreme Court ink spilt upon opinions in this "track" suggest
that once a "conflict" is found, the Rules of Decision Act all but disappears
from the analysis. 387 The critical question is whether the federal statutory
scheme in fact conflicts with state regulatory goals in the forum non
conveniens context. State approaches based upon notions of convenience,
382. See Kelleher, supra note 125, at 94.
383. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2000) (providing general grounds for removal); id. § 1443
(providing for removal of civil rights cases); Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, ch. 114, sec. 5, §
1453, 119 Star. 4, 12 (allowing removal of class actions).
384. See Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 109-11 (1987) (finding that
even if the Supreme Court had the power to create common law service-of-process rules, it
would reject the duty because of Congress's activity in the area).
385. If the Supreme Court abandons the forum non conveniens doctrine, federal courts
will in fact become much more attractive to foreign plaintiffs, but not simply because state
versions of forum non conveniens will remain intact. When a plaintiff sues an American
multinational, the ease of discovery, the familiarity of the federal bench with international
discovery procedures, and the federal judiciary's expertise in the application of foreign law are
all a draw to the federal system. Note, moreover, that in Ricoh, the Court treated as irrelevant
the likelihood that vertical forum shopping would occur as a result of the decision. Stewart
Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 30 (1988).
386. At most, the doctrine would be reduced to a gap-filling measure. Whether this type of
gap-filling in and of itself would violate the Rules of Decision Act is open to debate. Professoi
Redish argues that federal common law created for "gap-filling" purposes should not include
.matters simply not reached by the statute's text." Redish, supra note 323, at 796. My vision of
the inherent power supports Redish's point. The Supreme Court may, of course, integrate
aspects of federal forum non conveniens, which focus on the defendant's burden and
fundamental fairness, into a more sophisticated "reasonableness" inquiry in the personal
jurisdiction realm. For persuasive arguments that the forum non conveniens factors are already
taken into account in personal jurisdiction analysis, see generally Stein, supra note 16 and
Stewart, supra note 22. Abandonment of the forum non conveniens doctrine would leave a gap
in general jurisdiction cases. The Court has yet to decide whether a claim of general jurisdiction
must be tested by a "reasonableness" standard in addition to the contacts standard set forth in
HelicopterosNacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hald 466 U.S. 408 (1984). Forum non conveniens has
generally obviated the need for such a step in transnational cases. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying a reasonableness analysis to a
general jurisdiction case).
387. Ricoh, 487 U.S. at 26-27, 30-32.

HeinOnline -- 91 Iowa L. Rev. 1203 2005-2006

1204

91 IOWA LAWREVIEW

(2006]

ease of access to evidentiary materials, conservation of court resources,
harassment concerns, and the like, lie in territory occupied by the
congressional court-access regime. Through statutes specifying venue,
transfer, service of process, and subject matter jurisdiction, Congress has
taken into account the usual goals supporting state forum non conveniens
practice. Since federal statutory law and such state rules are in direct
Inc.
conflict,38 8 the only issue according to Stewart Organization,
,389 v. Ricoh Corp.
S
The federal
is whether the congressional legislation is constitutional.
statutes easily fall within the "arguably procedural" designation. Thus, state
forum non conveniens approaches sustained by Gulf Oil type reasoning are
preempted by the congressional statutes regulating federal court access.
State closed-door forum non conveniens regimes with substantive
regulatory goals, such as insulating resident defendants from liability for acts
abroad,3 90 might still present an Erie problem. On its face, the congressional
court-access scheme takes no position on the legitimacy of protecting parties
from transnational liability. Therefore, substantive closed-door state
approaches raise the predicate Erie question of whether a "conflict" between
federal and state law truly exists. One could argue that if Congress wished to
address state protectionism when it created the venue scheme, the Rules of

388. Gasperiniv. Centerfor Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996), could be read to require a
more deferential conflict analysis than the one that this Article employs when assessing the
scope of federal law. In her opinion for the Court, Justice Ginsburg did not give Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59 an expansive reading. Id. at 427. In response to Justice Scalia's argument
that Rule 59 conflicted directly with the New York statute and that a Rules Enabling Act analysis
was thus required, Justice Ginsburg dropped a footnote explaining that "[flederal courts have
interpreted the Federal Rules .. . with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory
policies." Id. at 427 n.7. Gasperiniinvolved either the choice between judge-made law and a state
statute, or a choice between Rule 59 and a state statute. Thus, the approach used in Gasperini
should only be relevant to conflicts involving federal judge-made doctrines or Federal Rules.
Here, I contend that we have a package of federal statutes that conflict with state court-access
rules. The constitutional power to enact statutes regulating federal court venue, jurisdiction,
and the like is found in the power to create the lower federal courts as augmented by the
Necessary and Proper Clause. The Rules of Decision Act, which might be thought to serve as an
interpretive canon in cases of state/federal conflicts, applies by its terms only to the courts, not
Congress.
389. Ricoh, 487 U.S. at 26-27 & n.4.
390. State statutes do not usually say this overtly. Closing the doors of your courts to actions
simply because they are based upon another state's law is unconstitutional under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause in Article IV of the United States Constitution. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S.
609, 613-14 (1951) (holding a Wisconsin statutory policy that excluded Illinois causes of action
forbidden under the Full Faith and Credit Clause). Compare, though, Professor Larry Kramer's
position that doing the same thing via forum non conveniens does not run afoul of that Clause
because "taking choice-of-law considerations into account together with a variety of other
relevant factors, and leading to dismissal only when adjudication of the particular case is truly
inconvenient," forum non conveniens operates in a more refined manner than allegedly simple
discriminatory practices. Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the
UnconstitutionalPublic Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1984 (1997).
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Decision Act required the venue legislation to be explicit on that point. 9 If
we use such an interpretive approach, we are left with a "straight-up" Erie
question: would failure to follow the state forum non conveniens formula be
"outcome determinative" because it generates forum shopping or represents
an inequitable administration of the laws? Absolutely. Under such an
interpretation of the federal court-access statutes, the Rules of Decision Act
would require federal courts to use state protectionist approaches in
applicable diversity actions.
But this argument overlooks critical characteristics of the congressional
statutory regime. The better position is that the United States statutory
scheme occupies the field. By choosing neutral court-access rules, Congress
rejected procedural protectionism.3 92 Neutral rules further the image of
federal courts as unbiased decision makers, untainted by state provincialism,
thus advancing the classic goals of federal diversity jurisdiction. 93 As
explained earlier in this Article, Congress reserved to itself the exclusive
right to legislate in the court-access arena through substance/procedure
limitation in the Rules Enabling Act.3 94 The notion that Congress reallocated
that power to the states via the Rules of Decision Act is belied by the scope
and quality of the federal court-access scheme. 395 State forum non
conveniens rules have no place in the federal courts. The gatekeeper
position for the United States courts is already occupied by the United States
Congress.
IV. CONCLUSION
The federal forum non conveniens framework is unconstitutional.
Though founded upon the inherent authority of Article III, the doctrine

391. Cf. Walker v. Armco Steel, 446 U.S. 740 (1980). As Professor Kramer explained in a
teacher's manual, "Walker suggests that, in diversity cases, the federal statute should be read not
to apply if it will displace substantive state law." TEACHER'S MANUAL TO CONFLICT OF LAWs:
CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 261 (6th ed. 2001).

392. Note that when Congress has wished to protect certain parties or to give a specific class
of plaintiffs an advantage, it has done so. The United States Code boasts hundreds of special
venue provisions, see supranotes 158-65 and accompanying text, as well as significant legislation
designed to give certain defendants procedural protection. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737. Congress knows how to write special
interest statutes. It is fair to assume that the use of neutral language in most of the
congressional court-access statutes is not accidental.
393. See Weinberg, supra note 290, at 58-60 (detailing aspirational goals behind neutral
rules of court access).
394.
See Burbank, supra note 97, at 1113; Kelleher, supra note 125, at 93-94.
395. One can argue that the United States Constitution and the Rules of Decision Act give
substantive state protectionist goals sufficient deference through the use of state substantive law
in diversity actions. Thus, state laws that directly immunize resident defendants from liability
should be enforced in federal diversity actions (so long as they are constitutional). Only state
protectionism disguised as the regulation of court access should be denied enforcement in
federal court because Congress has enacted its own court access scheme.
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occupies territory over which Congress constitutionally asserts regulatory
control. The Court has avoided this border dispute by applying a "clear
statement" test to congressional action-an approach that treats inherent
authority doctrines such as forum non conveniens as the backdrop against
which Congress is assumed to legislate. As this Article explains, the Court's
"clear statement" approach fundamentally misapprehends its relationship
with Congress. Forjudicially crafted doctrines residing on the frontier of the
inherent authority-those inherent power rules that are merely "beneficial,
helpful or appropriate"---the "clear statement" presumption should be
reversed. The Court, rather than Congress, should bear the burden of
ensuring that such inherent power innovations conflict neither directly nor
indirectly with the policy choices made by the United States Congress.
Applying an appropriately deferential analysis to the forum non
conveniens problem demonstrates that significant friction exists between
congressional regulatory goals and the federal forum non conveniens
regime. First, Congress has completely revised the general venue provisions
since Gulf Oil and Piper were decided. The statutory scheme now takes into
account the run-of-the-mill transnational case to which the forum non
conveniens doctrine is routinely applied. Second, countless federal statutes
now seek to regulate extraterritorial events. When federal law supplies the
rule of decision in a federal case, there is no place for the forum non
conveniens inquiry to operate; Congress has already balanced the relevant
Gulf Oil factors.
Third, a more deferential analysis reveals that both the existence of the
Rules Enabling Act and the substance/procedure line contained therein are
relevant to inherent power lawmaking of the "beneficial" variety. Because
the forum non conveniens doctrine sees frequent use and has a significant
impact on transnational litigation in the federal courts, it implicates the
formal rulemaking process set forth in the REA. By eschewing the REA
procedures, the Court evades the congressional oversight envisioned by the
legislation. Similarly, as Congress has become increasingly active on the
procedural front, the inherent power space available for judicial regulation
has diminished. The substance/procedure line drawn by 28 U.S.C. §
2072(b) provides a good proxy for congressional permission to regulate in
the outer reaches of the inherent power. This Article concludes that the
forum non conveniens doctrine invades the space reserved to Congress by
the Rules Enabling Act.
Lastly, the Rules of Decision Act provides another source of potential
conflict between the Court and Congress. If one ignores the existence of the
congressional court-access scheme, a Rules of Decision Act analysis suggests
that the federal courts should use some subset of state forum non
conveniens rules in federal diversity actions. But once we factor in the scope
and quality of the federal court-access regime, the Erie problem moves to
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another track. The federal statutory scheme regulating court access occupies
the field and renders conflicting state rules irrelevant.
As this Article has demonstrated, the contours of the inherent power
landscape have changed since Gu/f Oil and Piper. The federal forum non
conveniens doctrine now dwells in the congressional realm. The time has
come for the Court to retreat to constitutionally defensible ground and
abandon forum non conveniens to congressional rule.
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